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INTRODUCTION
Since the demise of press licensing in Britain 300 years
ago, the U.K. has positioned itself as a vanguard of
journalistic freedom—featuring a raucous and opinionated
press—even in the absence of constitutional speech and press
protections. 2 Yet in January 2014, the World Association of
Newspapers and News Publishers (WAN-IFRA)—a leading
press organization previously known for targeting press
2. See Editorial Bd., Britain’s Press Crackdown, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 19,
2013), available at http://www.nytimes.com/2013/03/20/opinion/britains-presscrackdown.html?.
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censorship in repressive regimes such as Azerbajian and
Myanmar—undertook an “unprecedented” fact-finding
mission in the U.K. to investigate governmental threats to
British press freedom. 3 It did so because Britain is currently
engaged in a press regulation effort that poses a significant
threat to press freedom both in the U.K. and far beyond
British shores. 4
The British press reform initiative began after
revelations in 2011 that the Rupert Murdoch-owned tabloid
News of the World had engaged in “industrial-scale” 5 phone
hacking, illegally intercepting the phone messages of
thousands of unsuspecting people for years. 6 Instead of
responding to the phone hacking revelations by focusing on
criminal law enforcement failures, however, the British
government launched a wide-ranging, year-long Inquiry,
headed by Lord Justice Brian Leveson, into the culture,
practices, and ethics of the British newspaper press. 7
3. Larry Kilman, International Delegation: UK Press Freedom Mission,
WORLD ASSOCIATION OF NEWSPAPER AND NEWS PUBLISHERS (Nov. 8, 2013),
http://www.wan-ifra.org/press-releases/2013/11/08/international-delegation-ukpress-freedom-mission.
4. WAN-IFRA recently released a critical report about the reform of
British press regulation. WORLD ASSOCIATION OF NEWSPAPER AND NEWS
PUBLISHERS, PRESS FREEDOM IN THE UNITED KINGDOM 6 (Mar. 2014)
[hereinafter WAN-IFRA, PRESS FREEDOM], available at http://www.wanifra.org/microsites/press-freedom (“Even the suggestion of a decline in Britain’s
regard for press freedom risks serious repercussions in other parts of the
world.”).
5. John F. Burns, Phone-Hacking Charges Seen as Chill on British
Journalism,
N.Y.
TIMES
(July
24,
2012),
available
at
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/07/25/world/europe/two-ex-editors-for-murdochto-be-charged-for-phone-hacking.html?_r=0.
6. See Lili Levi, Journalism Standards and “The Dark Arts”: The U.K.’s
Leveson Inquiry and the U.S. Media in the Age of Surveillance, 48 GA. L. REV.
907, 909 (2014).
7. LEVESON INQUIRY: CULTURE, PRACTICES AND ETHICS OF THE PRESS,
REPORT, 2012, H.C. 779, Executive Summary, ¶¶ 5, 7–9, (U.K.) [hereinafter
LEVESON REPORT], available at http://www.levesoninquiry.org.uk/about/thereport/. The fallout from phone-hacking is still continuing. See Katrin
Bennhold & Alan Cowell, Ex-Tabloid Executive Acquitted in British Phone
Hacking
Case,
N.Y.
TIMES
(June
24,
2014),
available
at
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/06/25/world/europe/rebekah-brooks-found-notguilty-in-phone-hacking-case.html (describing result of phone-hacking trial of
former tabloid editors Rebekah Brooks and Andy Coulson and noting potential
upcoming legal actions); Martin Hickman, Revealed: 10 Police Inquiries into
Illegal Data Techniques, INFORRM’S BLOG (July 12, 2014), available at
https://inforrm.wordpress.com/2014/07/12/revealed-10-police-inquiries-intoillegal-data-techniques-martin-hickman/
(detailing
continuing
police
investigations into various journalism practices).

326

SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW

[Vol: 55

Having issued an almost 2000-page Report damning
much of the newspaper press culture, Leveson called for a
new plan of “voluntary” self-regulation backed up by a
statutory oversight regime. 8 Under the scheme, newspapers
would independently establish a regulatory body, which
would in turn seek recognition and continuing certification
from a government-established certifying entity charged with
ensuring that the press’ self-regulator properly followed the
Leveson Report’s recommendations. Currently, the Levesonrecommended press oversight body has been established
pursuant to a government-favored Royal Charter.
Press resistance to the Royal Charter regime makes the
ultimate contours and details of British press reform
uncertain. What is certain, however, is that some kind of
Leveson-inspired reform is inevitable—certainly in light of
Prime Minister David Cameron’s warning to newspapers
that, otherwise, the press runs the risk of facing “hideous
statutory regulation” in the future. 9
While designed to be modest and proportionate, the
British effort to promote a “responsible” press via the Royal
Charter regime in fact effectuates a power play by
government and the political class against the press. It
introduces the Trojan horse of press control under the guise of
“voluntary” self-regulation to restrain the excesses of tabloid
journalism.
Its structural attempts to insulate such
regulation from political influence are unlikely to be effective.
The Royal Charter regime leads to predictable chilling effects
on the press, without sufficient commensurate benefits in
protecting press subjects’ privacy.
As a mid-twentieth
century regulatory template proposed for a twenty-first
century news environment, 10 it ignores the multiplicity of
press practices of the “networked Fourth Estate” 11—raising
questions about the scope of regulatory coverage as well as
disciplinary uses of approved journalistic codes in today’s

8. LEVESON REPORT, supra note 7.
9. Nicholas Watt, Cameron warns UK press: sign up to royal charter or
else,
THE
GUARDIAN
(Dec.
26,
2013),
available
at
http://www.theguardian.com/media/2013/dec/26/cameron-warns-uk-pressregulation.
10. See WAN-IFRA, PRESS FREEDOM, supra note 4, at 16.
11. See Yochai Benkler, A Free Irresponsible Press: Wikileaks and the Battle
Over the Soul of the Networked Fourth Estate, 46 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 311
(2011) (coining the phrase).
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diverse media context. At the same time, it invites abuse by
legacy press institutions, undermining press innovation by
protecting incumbents.
Arguing against the Leveson-influenced Royal Charter
regulatory approach does not entail indiscriminate approval
of egregious press practices. It simply questions whether less
restrictive alternatives to the regulatory option would not
better balance the interests at issue.
Regulatory institutions do not typically cede power;
politicians hope to control press coverage to their advantage;
press failures in accuracy and completeness are inevitable;
and moral panics can always be generated in order to justify
increased press oversight, when convenient. It is not enough
to hope that the new regulatory regime will operate with a
light touch.
The Royal Charter system cannot be evaluated without
recognizing the interlocking realities against which it will
function—diminished press power, and unprecedented efforts
by government to intimidate newspapers from reporting on
national security matters. Indeed, such regulatory regimes
can promote “new school” speech regulation, where
governments can achieve their ends through partnerships
with private power. 12 The background threat of regulation
can enable divide-and-conquer political strategies, effectively
inviting journalistic loyalty oaths and generating a divided—
and thereby weakened—press. Complex, multi-institutional
breakdowns (such as those implicated in the phone hacking
scandal) cannot properly be corrected by disproportionately
regulating just one of the participant institutions. Doing so is
likely to accomplish little more than enhance the relative
power of the others—a particularly dangerous development
when it comes to the press.
Certainly, misfeasance by government and the mighty is
likely to rise even in the ordinary course if the press is not
watching. But threats to accountability reporting are more
than typically worrisome today, when government actions
most demand a powerful Fourth Estate. The rise of the
surveillance state, the fetishization of security, and enhanced
governmental willingness to assert power all call for a strong

12. Cf. Jack M. Balkin, Old-School/New-School Speech Regulation, 127
HARV. L. REV. 2296 (2014) (describing “new school” techniques to control and
discipline speech in light of the digital infrastructure of communication today).
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watchdog press operating in the public interest.
This is not merely a local, U.K. matter. A diminution in
British press freedom “risks serious repercussions in other
parts of the world.” 13 By providing authoritarian regimes
with press-repressive examples, Britain significantly
diminishes its credibility in attempts to promote a broad
notion of press freedom abroad.
Part I of this Article sketches the history of British press
regulation, describes the Leveson Report’s recommendations,
and outlines the current status of press reform efforts in
Britain. Part II outlines the potentially worrisome aspects of
the Royal Charter approach for the optimal role of the press,
and concludes that the British press reform movement is
likely to do more harm than good, both in the U.K. and
globally.
I.

BRITISH PRESS REFORM, IN CONTEXT

The “press” is primarily understood in the U.K. to refer to
newspapers. Although a number of government inquiries
since the mid-twentieth century have sought to promote press
responsibility, revelations in 2011 of phone hacking by tabloid
newspapers triggered the most expansive assessment of the
state of the British press. As a result, a complex system of
statute-backed industry self-regulation is currently being
developed.
A. Overview of the British Press Sector
Britain boasts a large number of national newspapers, as
well as regional and local outlets. 14 British newspapers
broadly fall into three categories: broadsheets, 15 mid-market
“compact” titles, 16 and down-market tabloids. 17 In terms of
13. WAN-IFRA, PRESS FREEDOM, supra note 4, at 6.
14. LEVESON REPORT, supra note 7, pt. C, ch. 2 (describing eight major
publishers); THE NEWS MEDIA ASSOCIATION, http://www.newsmediauk.org/ (last
visited Jan. 12, 2015) (compiling local and regional newspaper information).
15. Broadsheets include The Daily Telegraph, The Financial Times, The
Guardian, and The Sunday Times. The term “broadsheet” refers to the size and
format of the newspaper, with long vertical pages. Broadsheet, WIKIPEDIA,
available at http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Broadsheet.
16. These include The Daily Mail and The Independent.
Compact
(newspaper), WIKIPEDIA, available at http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Compact
(newspaper).
17. The Sun, The Daily Mirror, and the now-shuttered News of the World
are examples. Rupert Murdoch closed down News of the World as a result of
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content, the broadsheets are associated with serious
journalism, in-depth coverage of hard news, and elite style. 18
At the opposite extreme are the “red-top” tabloids, whose
coverage is image-heavy, sensationalistic, and focused on
celebrity, the private lives of public people, human-interest
stories, and “salacious sinfulness.” 19 The black-top compacts
sit somewhere in between, using broadsheet style yet also
incorporating some entertainment into their pages. The
broadsheets represent the “responsible” press and are
sometimes referred to as the “quality press,” by contrast to
the tabloid “popular press.” 20
British newspapers are opinionated participants in public
debate, with tabloids especially proud of their reputation as
spirited and activist. 21 Unlike broadcast news programs,
partisanship and opinion are acceptable and expected in
British newspapers. 22 The British tabloids also range in their
political and party affiliations. 23
B. The British Approach to Newspaper Regulation
The

Leveson

Inquiry

was

not

the

first

official

the Leveson Inquiry into phone hacking. See, e.g., Robert Mackey, British
Tabloid to Close After More Serious Allegations, N.Y. TIMES (July 7, 2011),
available
at
http://thelede.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/07/07/more-seriousallegations-against-british-tabloid-editors/?_r=0. The mid-market papers are in
tabloid rather than broadsheet physical format, but the mid-market offerings
are distinguishable by their “black-top” masthead (as opposed to the “red-top”
masthead of the down-market tabloids).
18. Broadsheet,
OXFORD
ENGLISH
DICTIONARY,
available
at
http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/23531?redirectedFrom=broadsheet#eid.
19. Rodney A. Smolla, Will Tabloid Journalism Ruin the First Amendment
for the Rest of Us?, 9 DEPAUL-LCA J. ART. & ENT. L. & POL’Y 1, 2 (1998). Much
has been written on tabloid journalism. A WestlawNext search on September
29, 2013 netted 138 titles. See also John Fiske, Popularity and the Politics of
Information, in JOURNALISM AND POPULAR CULTURE (Peter Dahlgren & Colin
Sparks eds. 1992) (describing the complexity of tabloid media).
20. See PAPERBOY BLOG, UK Newspaper Guide, http://www.thepaper
boy.com/uk/uk-newspaper-guide.cfm (last visited Feb. 26, 2015).
21. See, e.g., Karen Sanders & Mark Hanna, British Journalists, THE
GLOBAL JOURNALIST IN THE 21ST CENTURY 220–21 (David H. Weaver & Lars
Willnat eds., 2012); Brett Mills, Tabloid Tales: Other News, Other Voices, 2003
J. INST. JUST. & INT’L STUD. 23 (2003).
22. See, e.g., LEVESON REPORT, supra note 7, pt. B, ch. 2, ¶ 5.7. See also
David Folkenflik, In London, A Case Study In Opinionated Press, NPR (Jan. 4,
2011), available at http://www.npr.org/2011/01/04/132629428/in-london-a-casestudy-in-opinionated-press.
23. For a BBC description of political affiliation of major papers see BBC,
The politics of UK newspapers (Sept. 30, 2009), available at
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/politics/8282189.stm.
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examination of the standards of the British newspaper press.
Scandals regarding breaches of privacy and outrageous
newsgathering techniques had led to six official examinations
of the British newspaper press since World War II. 24
Official self-regulation of newspapers in Britain was
initiated in 1953, when the newspaper industry established
the General Council of the Press in response to a Royal
Despite
numerous
Commission
recommendation. 25
subsequent efforts to improve the credibility of the selfregulatory body, criticism persisted and the threat of
statutory regulation was bandied about. By 1991, the Home
Office minister was warning that “the press—the popular
press—is drinking in the Last Chance Saloon.” 26 In response,
the newspaper publishers established the Press Complaints
Commission (PCC) as an independent body charged with
maintaining and promoting a professional Code of Practice 27
by journalists, and dealing with complaints about breaches of
the Code by newspapers and magazines. 28 Membership in the
24. LEVESON REPORT, supra note 7, pt. D, ch. 1 (describing the 1947, 1962
and 1974 Royal Commissions, the 1972 Younger Commission into Privacy, and
the 1990 and 1993 assessments by a Departmental Committee chaired by Sir
David Calcutt). See also WAN-IFRA, PRESS FREEDOM, supra note 4, at 10–12.
25. The Council had been tasked with defending press freedom and
investigating complaints. See CULTURE, MEDIA AND SPORT COMMITTEE, HOUSE
OF COMMONS, PRESS STANDARDS, PRIVACY AND LIBEL, SECOND REPORT OF
SESSION 2009–10, vol. 1, H.C. 362-I, at 115 (U.K.) [hereinafter CMS COMMITTEE
SECOND REPORT]. The General Council of the Press was re-formed as the Press
Council in 1962. The Calcutt Inquiry in 1990 recommended its replacement
with a Press Complaints Commission. Id.
26. See Roy Greenslade, A decade of diplomacy, THE GUARDIAN (Feb. 4,
2001), available at http://www.theguardian.com/media/2001/feb/05/mondaymedi
asection.pressandpublishing.
27. The Code of Practice enforced by the PCC is written and revised by the
Editors’ Code Committee, consisting of the Chairman and Director of the PCC
as well as editors of national, regional, and local newspapers. CMS COMMITTEE
SECOND REPORT, supra note 25, at 115. By contrast to the membership of the
PCC, the Editors’ Code Committee has no lay members (except the Chairman
and Director of the PCC). Id.
28. CMS COMMITTEE SECOND REPORT, supra note 25. See also LEVESON
REPORT, supra note 7, pt. D, ch. 2. The self-regulatory system regulating
newspapers has consisted of three parts for the past decade: the PCC, the
Editors’ Code Committee, and the Press Board of Finance (known as the
PressBoF). The PCC disbanded in September 2014, and was replaced by IPSO,
the Independent Press Standards Organization.
PRESS COMPLAINTS
COMMISSION, http://www.pcc.org.uk (last visited Jan. 12, 2015). Until then, the
board of the PCC had consisted of ten lay members and seven editors. CMS
COMMITTEE SECOND REPORT, supra note 25, at 115. The system was financed
through the PressBoF, with funding by a levy paid by member newspapers and
magazines. Id. The PCC assessed complaints to determine compliance with the
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PCC was voluntary, although most major papers belonged. 29
The Leveson Report issued a scathing indictment of the
PCC, principally on the grounds that it was insufficiently
independent of the press industry and not a true regulator. 30
As a result of widespread criticism, the PCC announced in
2012 that it would move into a transitional phase before
disbanding. 31 As is further detailed below, the PCC has now
been replaced by IPSO, the newspaper industry’s
Independent Press Standards Organization. 32
C. Phone-Hacking and the Leveson Inquiry Into the
Culture, Practices and Ethics of the Press
Prime Minister David Cameron appointed the Leveson
Inquiry in July 2011 with a wide-ranging remit. 33 Chairman
Justice Leveson himself characterized it as “almost
breathtaking in its width.” 34 After a year of taking testimony,
Justice Leveson issued a four-volume Report of its inquiry
into the culture, practices, and ethics of the press. 35 Having
diagnosed a systemic cultural problem with the operations of
the press—and particularly the tabloids—Leveson sought to
resolve it by a series of recommendations designed to be more

Code. If it found a breach, the offending newspaper could offer to resolve the
complaint, but if its offer was deemed unsatisfactory, the PCC could adjudicate
the case and the newspaper would be obliged to publish the PCC adjudication
“with due prominence.” Id. at 116.
29. CMS COMMITTEE SECOND REPORT, supra note 25, at 115. Northern &
Shell, owners of The Daily Express, The Daily Star and OK! Magazine,
withdrew from the PCC in 2011. See WAN-IFRA, PRESS FREEDOM, supra note
4, at 12.
30. LEVESON REPORT, supra note 7, Executive Summary, ¶¶ 41–46. The
PCC system had been subject to critique since its inception, including by its
inventor, Sir David Calcutt, who concluded in a second report in 1993 that selfregulation was not working and recommended statutory regulation instead. Id.
at 116–17. WAN-IFRA, PRESS FREEDOM, supra note 4, at 11.
31. Press Release, Press Complaints Commission, PCC transition to a new
regulatory
body
(Mar.
9,
2012),
available
at
http://www.pcc.org.uk/news/?article=NzcyNA==. See also LEVESON REPORT,
supra note 7, Executive Summary, ¶ 41. The PCC continued to resolve cases
and enforce its Editors’ Code of Ethics, and issued a report of 2012 complaint
statistics prior to its closure. Press Release, Press Complaints Commission,
PCC
publishes
2012
complaints
statistics,
available
at
http://www.pcc.org.uk/news/index.html?article=ODQ3MA==.
32. See infra pt. I, § D(2).
33. LEVESON REPORT, supra note 7, pt. A, ch. 1, ¶¶ 1.2–.4.
34. Id. pt. A, ch. 2, ¶ 1.9.
35. See id. pt. A, ch. 1–3 (describing the inquiry); id. pt. A, ch. 4 (describing
the Report).
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effective than the prior six attempts at press reform.
Determined that his Report not find a place “on the second
shelf of a journalism professor’s study,” 36 Lord Justice
Leveson sought to craft a “genuinely independent and
effective system of self-regulation.” 37
In the meantime, the police continued to investigate
possible illegal behavior by journalists (such as phone
hacking and bribing officials for information) 38—and prior
investigations began coming to fruition with criminal trials
for numerous press defendants. 39
The British public and politicians mobilized and
expressed intense interest—as evidenced, inter alia, by the
many articles on the subject appearing in the Guardian
newspaper alone. 40 Celebrities such as J.K. Rowling and
Sienna Miller pushed publicly for press regulation in favor of

36. John Plunkett & Josh Halliday, Leveson inquiry: Jeremy Paxman,
Andrew Marr, Lord Reid appear, THE GUARDIAN (May 23, 2012), available at
http://www.theguardian.com/media/blog/2012/may/23/leveson-inquiry-paxmanmarr-live?CMP=twt_fd (describing Justice Leveson’s response to witness).
37. LEVESON REPORT, supra note 7, Executive Summary,¶ 51.
38. See, e.g., REUTERS, Police investigating Trinity Mirror over phone
hacking
liability
(Sept.
12,
2013),
available
at
http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/09/12/us-trinity-mirror-hacking-idUSBRE9
8B06A20130912; Daniel Miller, Police investigating 600 new phone-hacking
incidents at the News of the World ‘after suspect turns supergrass,’ DAILY MAIL
(Mar. 16, 2013), available at http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article2294305/Police-investigating-600-new-phone-hacking-incidents-News-Worldsuspect-turns-supergrass.html (describing Operation Weeting as now likely to
extend until 2015).
39. Lisa O’Carroll, Rebekah Brooks trial over phone-hacking charges
delayed,
THE
GUARDIAN
(Aug.
22,
2013),
available
at
http://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2013/aug/22/rebekah-brooks-phone-hacktrial-delayed. Recently, former NEWS OF THE WORLD chief executive Rebekah
Brooks was acquitted and former editor Andrew Colson convicted after an eightmonth phone-hacking trial. Lisa O’Carroll & Patrick Wintour, Andy Coulson
guilty over phone hacking as Rebekah Brooks walks free, THE GUARDIAN (June
24, 2014), available at http://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2014/jun/24/andycoulson-rebekah-brooks-phone-hacking-trial; Bennhold & Cowell, supra note 7;
Alan Cowell & Katrin Bennhold, Andy Coulson Gets 18 Months in Tabloid
Phone
Hacking,
N.Y.
TIMES
(July
4,
2014),
available
at
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/07/05/world/europe/andy-coulson-to-be-sentencedin-phone-hacking-case.html. Phone hacking trials of other defendants continue.
See, e.g., Lisa O’Carroll, Ex-Sunday Mirror journalist charged with phone
hacking,
THE
GUARDIAN
(Oct.
15,
2014),
available
at
http://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2014/oct/15/sunday-mirror-journalistphone-hacking.
40. For a gateway to THE GUARDIAN’s archive of Leveson and phonehacking
related
articles,
see
THE
GUARDIAN,
US
media,
http://www.theguardian.com/media (last visited Jan. 12, 2015).
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privacy. 41 Victim-representing groups, such as Hugh Grantfronted Hacked Off, emerged with the goal of promoting the
passage of press regulatory reform. 42
Although it acknowledged the importance of a free press
and the extent to which the British press had fulfilled its
important mission, 43 the Leveson Report found significant
flaws in the culture, ethics, and practices of the newspaper
press leading to “press behaviour that, at times, can only be
described as outrageous.” 44
The Report identified problems on three fronts: in
newsgathering, reporting, and the attitude of the press.
Newsgathering too often involved not just phone-hacking, but
also covert surveillance, blagging, 45 deception, excessive
persistence (through tactics such as door-stepping, chases by
photographers, insistent phone calls), illegal trade in personal
information, and some instances of police bribery “in
circumstances where it is extremely difficult to see any public
interest justification.” 46
As for reporting, the press sometimes “reckless[ly] . . .
prioriti[zed] sensational stories, almost irrespective of the
harm [they could cause], all the while heedless of the public
interest[,]” 47 published private information without consent,
showed reckless disregard for accuracy, and engaged in
misrepresentation, embellishment, and distortion. 48
With respect to the press’ attitude in response to
complaints, the Report identified a lack of respect for privacy

41. See Lisa O’Carroll, Leveson phone-hacking inquiry: JK Rowling among
‘core participants’, THE GUARDIAN (Sept. 14, 2011), available at
http://www.theguardian.com/media/2011/sep/14/leveson-phone-hacking-inquiryjk-rowling.
42. See HACKED OFF, http://hackinginquiry.org/ (last visited Jan. 12, 2015)
(Hacked Off’s home page).
43. See, e.g., LEVESON REPORT, supra note 7, Executive Summary, ¶¶ 5, 8–
9.
44. Id. ¶ 7.
45. The Leveson Report defines “blagging” as “deception.” Id. pt. A, ch. 2, ¶
1.6. The Oxford Dictionaries online define “blagging” as “obtain[ing] (something)
by using persuasion or guile.” Blag, OXFORD DICTIONARIES, available at
http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/us/definition/english/blag.
46. LEVESON REPORT, supra note 7, Executive Summary, ¶ 34. Of course,
many of these behaviors are illegal and subject to civil and/or criminal
punishment (as the criminal trial of Rebekah Brooks and Andrew Coulson
demonstrates).
47. Id.¶ 32.
48. Id. ¶¶ 32, 38.
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and dignity; 49 a “cultural tendency within parts of the press
vigorously to resist or dismiss complainants almost as a
matter of course[;]” 50 a refusal to investigate even charges of
systemic criminality; 51 a propensity of newspapers under
attack to attack their attackers (thereby intimidating and
deterring complainants); 52 a hesitancy to break ranks and
criticize other papers’ practices; 53 and a failure of governance
and compliance systems that might have averted
misbehavior. 54 The Report highlighted the press’ lack of
remorse and defensive failure to self-examine as factors
exacerbating the underlying newsgathering and reporting
errors it described. 55
The Leveson Report recommended the establishment of
an independent regulatory body tasked with “the dual roles of
promoting high standards of journalism and protecting the
rights of individuals.” 56 An independent Board, whose chair
and members would be selected by an appointment panel,
would govern the body. In turn, that Board’s members would
be independent of both the industry and government and
selected in an independent manner. 57 While the Board should
include “people with relevant expertise,” there should be no
serving editors on the Board and its majority should be
independent of the press. 58
The new self-regulatory body would have a multitude of
roles, including: creating and enforcing a standards code;
defining and issuing guidance on the public interest and the
code; requiring appropriate internal governance processes;
enabling whistle-blowing reporting mechanisms; adjudicating
individual complaints; investigating, on its own initiative,
serious or systemic breaches of the code and failures to
comply with its directives; providing pre-publication advice to
editors; directing the nature, extent and placement of
apologies; and operating an arbitration service to deal with

49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.

Id. ¶ 36 (speaking specifically about NEWS OF THE WORLD).
Id. ¶ 39.
LEVESON REPORT, supra note 7, Executive Summary, ¶¶ 21–22.
Id. ¶¶ 34, 39.
Id. ¶ 23.
Id. ¶¶ 31, 36.
Id. ¶ 39.
LEVESON REPORT, supra note 7, Executive Summary, ¶ 57.
Id. at Summary of Recommendations, ¶¶ 1–5; id. pt. K, ch. 7, ¶ 4.8.
Id. at Summary of Recommendations, ¶ 4; id. pt. K, ch. 7, ¶¶ 4.6, 4.10.
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civil law claims. 59 In drafting the code of practice, the Board
could be advised by a Code Committee that could include (but
not be limited to) serving editors.
In turn, the code to be adopted by the Board would take
into account the importance of freedom of speech, the
interests of the public (including the public interest in
detecting or exposing crime or serious impropriety, protecting
public health and safety and preventing the public from being
seriously misled) and the rights of individuals. 60
As for complaints, unlike the PCC’s limited jurisdiction to
hear complaints only from the victims of press breaches, the
new Board would have the power “to hear complaints
wherever they come from” including “a representative group
affected by the breach, or a third party seeking to ensure
accuracy of published information.” 61
The Board would have the right to require remedial
action such as corrections or apologies, the prerogative to
require compilation and public availability of code compliance
data, 62 the authority to investigate systemic or serious
breaches, and the power to impose “appropriate and
proportionate sanctions, (including financial sanctions up to
1% of turnover with a maximum of £1M)” for “serious or
systemic breaches of the standards code or governance
requirements of the body.” 63
The Leveson Report also made specific recommendations
for consideration by the body. For instance, it suggested a
clearer statement of the standards to be expected of editors
and journalists than is in the current Editors’ Code of

59. Id. at Summary of Recommendations, ¶¶ 7–20; id. pt. K, ch. 7, ¶¶ 4.21–
4.36.
60. Id. at Executive Summary, ¶ 8; id. pt. K, ch. 7, ¶ 4.23. The code “must
cover standards of: (a) conduct, especially in relation to the treatment of other
people in the process of obtaining material; (b) appropriate respect for privacy
where there is no sufficient public interest justification for breach; and (c)
accuracy, and the need to avoid misrepresentation.” Id. at Executive Summary,
¶ 8. See also Royal Charter on Self-Regulation of the Press sched. 3, ¶ 8, Oct.
30,
2013
[hereinafter
Royal
Charter],
available
at
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/2
54116/Final_Royal_Charter_25_October_2013_clean__Final_.pdf.
61. LEVESON REPORT, supra note 7, Summary of Recommendations, ¶ 11;
id. pt. K, ch. 7, ¶ 4.30.
62. There would also be reporting requirements for the Board. Id. at
Summary of Recommendations, ¶ 15; id. pt. K, ch. 7,¶ 4.42.
63. Id. at Summary of Recommendations, ¶ 19; id. pt. K, ch. 7, ¶ 4.38.
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Practice adopted under the auspices of the PCC. 64
It
indicated that the body “should make it clear that
newspapers will be strictly accountable, under their
standards code, for any material that they publish, including
photographs (however sourced). 65 It also recommended that
the new self-regulatory body should provide a service to warn
the press, broadcasters, and photographers “when an
individual has made it clear that they do not welcome press
intrusion.” 66 In addition to requiring the body to “provide
guidance on the interpretation of the public interest that
justifies what would otherwise constitute a breach of the
Code[,]” 67 the Report recommended that when the public
interest justification is to be relied on to excuse a breach of
the code, “a record should be available of the factors weighing
against and in favour of publication, along with a record of
the reasons for the conclusions reached.” 68
As the new regulatory body would lack credibility if the
majority of newspaper publishers did not subscribe, the
Leveson Report also described “carrot-and-stick” incentives
designed to promote participation. The principal carrot for
membership in the regulatory body was that, in lieu of
expensive litigation, subscription would entitle members to
the exclusive use of a “fair, fast and inexpensive arbitration
service” operating under the auspices of the regulatory body. 69
On the “stick” side of the model, the Report provided that
newspapers choosing not to join the new body would be
disadvantaged in three ways. They would not have access to
the cheap, expert, and rapid arbitral process. 70 Once in court
in defamation, privacy, breach of confidence, or other media

64. Id. at Summary of Recommendations, ¶ 36. See also id. pt. K, ch. 7, ¶¶
4.18–4.24 (discussing the problems with the old code and the need for a clearer
alternative).
65. Id. at Summary of Recommendations, ¶ 40; id. pt. K, ch. 9, ¶ 2.9.
66. LEVESON REPORT, supra note 7, Summary of Recommendations, ¶ 41;
id. pt. K, ch. 7, ¶ 4.35.
67. Id. at Summary of Recommendations, ¶ 42; id. pt. K, ch. 7, ¶ 4.24.
68. Id. at Summary of Recommendations, ¶ 43; id. pt. K, ch. 7, ¶ 4.24.
69. Id. at Summary of Recommendations, ¶ 26; id. pt. K, ch.7. ¶ 5.5. The
Report stated that if an arbitration arm were not created, then qualified oneway cost shifting would be introduced for defamation, breach of confidence,
privacy and similar media-related litigation, as proposed by Justice Jackson.
Id. pt. J, ch. 3, § 6. See also Royal Charter, supra note 60, sched. 3.
70. See LEVESON REPORT, supra note 7, Summary of Recommendations, ¶¶
26, 67. See also id. pt. J, ch. 3, ¶¶ 6.7–6.8, 6.10 (describing the benefits of the
arbitration process to a publisher and its strength as an incentive).

2015]

TAMING THE “FERAL BEAST”

337

tort cases, they would be liable for exemplary damages if they
lost. 71 If they won, they would not be eligible to receive cost
recovery as currently available, and could be required to pay
costs. 72
In its most controversial aspect, the Leveson Report
recommended Parliamentary enactment of a statutory
underpinning, which would identify the legitimate
requirements of an independent self-regulatory body and
“provide a mechanism to recognise and certify that a new
body meets them.” 73 The requirements for recognition would
be the Leveson Report recommendations. An independent
recognition body would assess—both at its inception and
thereafter as well—whether the self-regulatory body was
designed and operated to satisfy the statutory requisites.
D. Where Things Stand Now
After the Leveson Report’s release, Prime Minister David
Cameron quickly rejected the recommended statutory
underpinning, saying that statutory press regulation would
“cross the Rubicon” and undo centuries of press freedom. 74
Yet Labour and the Liberal Democrats supported Leveson. 75
During cross-party talks, it was suggested that
Parliamentary legislation underpinning the recognition body
could be avoided if the body were established under a Royal
Charter similar to that which established the BBC or the
British Council. 76 The ensuing Royal Charter on Self71.
72.
73.
74.

Id. at Summary of Recommendations, ¶ 68.
Id. ¶ 67–69.
Id. ¶ 27; id. pt. K, ch.7, ¶ 6.4.
See, e.g., Lisa O’Carroll, Leveson report: what happened next – Q&A,
THE
GUARDIAN
(Feb.
12,
2013),
available
at
http://www.theguardian.com/media/2013/feb/12/leveson-what-happened-next.
75. Lisa O’Carroll, Defamation bill set to be lost due to ‘Leveson’ clause, THE
GUARDIAN
(Mar.
05,
2013),
available
at
http://www.theguardian.com/law/2013/mar/05/defamation-bill-leveson-clause.
76. Id. The Royal Charter alternative is widely attributed to Oliver Letwin,
a Cabinet Office minister in the Cameron government. See, e.g., Charlie Potter,
Press regulation: all you need to know, 24 B.J.R. no. 1, 15, at 16 (2013). Royal
Charters, granted by the sovereign on the advice of the Privy Council, have a
history dating back to the thirteenth century. PRIVY COUNCIL OFFICE,
Chartered bodies, available at http://privycouncil.independent.gov.uk/royalcharters/chartered-bodies/; PRIVY COUNCIL OFFICE, Privy Council members,
available at http://privycouncil.independent.gov.uk/privy-council/privy-councilmembers/. Membership in the Privy Council is for life, but “only Ministers of
the democratically elected Government of the day participate in its policy work.”
PRIVY
COUNCIL
OFFICE,
Overview,
available
at
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Regulation of the Press ultimately received royal assent on
October 30, 2013. 77
In addition to the Royal Charter initiative, Parliament
adopted two pieces of legislation designed to further
Leveson’s proposed press reform system: (1) amendments to
the Crimes and Courts Act 2013 effectuating the costs and
exemplary damages incentive provisions proposed by
Leveson, 78 and (2) a provision in the Regulatory Reform Act
designed to establish a super-majority vote requirement for
Parliamentary amendments to the press regulatory system. 79
1. The Royal Charter
The Leveson Report did not recommend the Royal
Charter. Instead, the Royal Charter approach was a “half-

http://privycouncil.independent.gov.uk/privy-council/. By convention, the Queen
in Council follows the advice of her ministers on the Privy Council. Id. Once
the only means of incorporating a body, royal charters are now “comparatively
rare.”
PRIVY COUNCIL OFFICE, Chartered bodies, available at
http://privycouncil.independent.gov.uk/royal-charters/chartered-bodies/.
See
also PATRICK O’CONNOR QC, THE CONSTITUTIONAL ROLE OF THE PRIVY
COUNCIL
AND
THE
PREROGATIVE
7
(2009),
available
at
http://www.justice.org.uk/data/files/resources/35/The-Constitutional-Role-of-thePrivy-Council-26-January-2009-.pdf.
77. Royal Charter, supra note 60; Patrick Wintour, Press regulation royal
charter given go-ahead by the Queen, THE GUARDIAN (Oct. 30, 2013), available
at
http://www.theguardian.com/media/2013/oct/30/press-regulation-royalcharter-approval. See also INFORRM’S BLOG, The Privy Council and the Royal
Charters:
how
does
it
all
work?
(Oct.
8,
2013),
http://inforrm.wordpress.com/2013/10/08/the-privy-council-and-the-cross-partycharter-some-background/#more-22794; Josh Halliday & Mark Sweney, Royal
charter: political parties reach deal on press regulation system, THE GUARDIAN
(Oct.
11,
2013),
available
at
http://www.theguardian.com/media/2013/oct/11/royal-charter-press-regulationfinal-draft-newspapers.
78. See Crime and Courts Act, 2013, c. 22, pt. 2, §§ 34–42 (U.K.), available
at http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2013/22/contents/enacted.
See also
Potter, supra note 76, at 15–23.
79. This measure prohibited amendment or dissolution of the Charter
without compliance with its required two-thirds super-majority Parliamentary
vote. This was intended as reassurance to the press that the regulatory system
would be independent of politicians. See Potter, supra note 76. The others were
the provisions (now in the Crime and Courts Act, 2013) offering protection to
“relevant publishers” who had opted in to the new system from legal costs in
certain media civil cases, and permitting courts to impose exemplary damages
in such cases on “relevant publishers” who had not opted for membership. Id.
The cases to which these financial incentives would apply are media-related:
libel, slander, breach of confidence, privacy, malicious falsehood, and
harassment. Id.
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way house” alternative, 80 designed to avoid Parliamentary
involvement in press regulation while ensuring compliance
After a
with the Leveson Report’s recommendations. 81
politically-charged year of failed compromise and contending
draft Royal Charters, 82 the revised Royal Charter established
the legal framework for the regulatory structure
recommended by the Leveson Report. 83
The Royal Charter inaugurates a Recognition Panel
charged with recognition of press industry self-regulators in
accordance with the terms of the Charter. 84 The Recognition
Panel is to evaluate applications for recognition from
regulators, review whether regulators granted recognition
should continue to be certified, and report on the success or
failure of the recognition system. 85 Pursuant to the Charter,

80. WAN-IFRA, PRESS FREEDOM, supra note 4, at 12.
81. Id. (“The Royal Charter was proposed as a means to ‘take parliament
out of the equation[.]’ ”).
82. After discussions involving all three political parties as well as press
regulation activists Hacked Off, a cross-party draft Royal Charter was released
in March 2013. Draft Royal Charter on Self-Regulation of the Press, Mar. 18,
2013, available at https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/leveson-reportdraft-royal-charter-for-proposed-body-to-recognise-press-industry-self-regulator.
The draft charter largely reflected the Leveson approach. See generally id. The
newspaper publishers offered their contending proposed charter, which watered
down some of the Leveson Report’s recommendations. Society of Editors, Draft
Royal Charter for the Independent Self-Regulation of the Press, available at
http://www.theguardian.com/media/interactive/2013/apr/25/draft-alternativeroyal-charter-press-regulation. For comparisons of the contending proposed
Royal Charters, see, for example, Potter, supra note 76; MEDIA STANDARDS
TRUST, THE CROSS-PARTY ROYAL CHARTER VS THE PRESSBOF ROYAL CHARTER:
A COMPARISON (2013), available at www.mediastandardstrust.org.
The
newspaper industry Royal Charter alternative was ultimately rejected by a
committee of the Queen’s Privy Council. See Letter from Danny Alexander,
Chief Sec’y to the Treasury, and Maria Miller, Sec’y of State for Culture, Media
and Sport, Dep’t for Culture, Media & Sport, to Richard Tilbrook, Clerk of the
Privy
Council
(Oct.
8,
2013),
available
at
https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/recommendation-on-pressbofpetition-for-royal-charter—2. The newspaper industry sought an appeal of that
decision. See WAN-IFRA, PRESS FREEDOM, supra note 4, at 17. Both that
appeal and a previous request by the newspaper industry for judicial review of
the royal charter process were denied. See Lisa O’Carroll, Press regulation:
Newspapers lose court of appeal battle over rival royal charter, THE GUARDIAN
(May 1, 2014), available at http://www.theguardian.com/media/2014/may/0
1/press-regulation-newspaper-court-appeal-royal-charter.
83. Because the Royal Charter is designed to effectuate the Leveson
Report’s press regulatory structure, this Article refers interchangeably to the
Royal Charter and Leveson regulatory approaches.
84. Royal Charter, supra note 60.
85. Id. ¶ 4.1.
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and through the work of an appointment committee
established by the Commissioner for Public Appointments, 86 a
chairman of the press recognition panel was appointed 87 and
the full body installed as of November 3, 2014. 88
The press’ response to the Royal Charter scheme has
been overwhelmingly negative, with numerous articles
characterizing the Charter’s Leveson-reliant approach as the
end of press freedom in Britain. 89 In addition to substantive
concerns, the newspaper industry has objected to the political
process behind the Royal Charter, suggesting that it excluded
the press, reflected manipulation at the hands of politicians
and interest groups with political agendas targeting the
popular press, 90 and evaded parliamentary debate and

86. See COMMISSIONER FOR PUBLIC APPOINTMENTS, Press Self-Regulation,
http://publicappointmentscommissioner.independent.gov.uk/press-selfregulation/ (last visited Jan. 13, 2015). See also Roy Greenslade, Words of
Leveson open to interpretation amid the mud-slinging, LONDON EVENING
STANDARD
(Jan.
29,
2014),
available
at
http://www.standard.co.uk/business/media/words-of-leveson-open-tointerpretation-amid-the-mudslinging-9092913.html.
87. Dr. David Wolfe, QC was appointed as the inaugural chairman of the
recognition panel. Roy Greenslade, Barrister David Wolfe to chair the press
regulation recognition panel, THE GUARDIAN (June 26, 2014), available at
http://www.theguardian.com/media/greenslade/2014/jun/26/press-regulationipso; PRESS RECOGNITION PANEL, http://pressrecognitionpanel.org.uk/word/
(last visited Jan. 13, 2015).
88. See, e.g., Roy Greenslade, Royal Charter’s ‘press recognition panel’
recruits five board members, THE GUARDIAN (Oct. 31, 2014), available at
http://www.theguardian.com/media/greenslade/2014/oct/31/press-regulationleveson-report.
89. See, e.g., Tim Shipman & Gerri Peev, Approved behind closed doors,
curbs that end three centuries of Press freedom, DAILY MAIL (Oct. 30, 2013),
available at http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2480676/Approved-closeddoors-curbs-end-centuries-Press-freedom.html. See also DR. GORDON NEIL
RAMSEY, HOW NEWSPAPERS COVERED PRESS REGULATION AFTER LEVESON –
MEDIA STANDARDS TRUST ANALYSIS, MEDIA STANDARDS TRUST (Sept. 4, 2014) )
[hereinafter
MEDIA
STANDARDS
TRUST
REPORT],
available
at
http://mediastandardstrust.org/mst-news/how-newspapers-covered-pressregulation-after-leveson-media-standards-trust-analysis/ (describing extensive,
negative and “polarized” coverage of the issue).
90. Newspapers have claimed that the cross-party talks leading to the
March 2013 proposed cross-party charter involved Hacked Off, but not the
press, and therefore were skewed from their inception. See, e.g., James
Chapman, Unveiled, a tough new watchdog to preserve freedom of the Press:
Newspapers launch own Royal Charter with teeth to protect the public - and
independence to prevent political meddling, DAILY MAIL (Apr. 25, 2013),
available at http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2314971/Freedom-pressNewspapers-launch-Royal-Charter-teeth-protect-public.html. See also WANIFRA, PRESS FREEDOM, supra note 4, at 14–15.
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opportunity for public consultation. 91
In turn, Charter
proponents have vociferously accused the newspaper
publishers of failing to cover press regulation fairly and
exaggerating the threats posed by the Royal Charter system
simply in order to maintain their own unaccountable power. 92
There is a “high level of animosity” between the two
positions. 93
2. IPSO and IMPRESS
Against the backdrop of competing draft Royal Charters,
the newspaper publishers announced the launching of
IPSO—the Independent Press Standards Organization—to
which a majority of the industry had pledged to subscribe. 94
Although a few major newspapers, such as The Guardian,
The Independent, and the Financial Times, have chosen not
to join IPSO at this point, 95 the IPSO organization debuted in
September 2014. 96 The IPSO appointments panel has been
established and its inaugural chair appointed. 97

91. WAN-IFRA, PRESS FREEDOM, supra note 4, at 15.
92. See generally HACKED OFF, http://hackinginquiry.org/ (last visited Jan.
12, 2015). See also MEDIA STANDARDS TRUST REPORT, supra note 89.
93. WAN-IFRA, PRESS FREEDOM, supra note 4, at 14.
94. See, e.g., Lisa O’Carroll, Press industry pushes ahead with new regulator
despite political deadlock, THE GUARDIAN (July 8, 2013), available at
http://www.theguardian.com/media/2013/jul/08/press-industry-new-regulator.
See also NEWS UK, Independent Press Standards Organization (July 8, 2013),
available
at
http://www.news.co.uk/2013/07/independent-press-standardsorganisation/. See also WAN-IFRA, PRESS FREEDOM, supra note 4, at 17–18.
95. See Editorial, The Guardian view on the new press regulator, Ipso, THE
GUARDIAN
(Sept.
4,
2014),
available
at
http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2014/sep/04/guardian-view-newpress-regulator-ipso (explaining THE GUARDIAN’s position); Roy Greenslade,
Financial Times rejects Ipso in favour of its own editorial complaints system,
THE
GUARDIAN
(Apr.
17,
2014),
available
at
http://www.theguardian.com/media/greenslade/2014/apr/17/press-regulationfinancialtimes (describing Financial Times’ decision regarding IPSO
membership). The papers’ decision to wait seems less due to a preference for a
Leveson body under the cross-party Royal Charter as opposed to a concern that
IPSO would be controlled by News UK, Associated Newspapers and Telegraph
Media Group—the biggest national newspapers. Mark Sweney, Guardian
rejects press watchdog as ‘own goal’ threatening independence, THE GUARDIAN
(Aug. 6, 2013), available at http://www.theguardian.com/media/2013/aug/06/g
uardian-rejects-press-watchdog-threatens-independence.
96. INDEPENDENT PRESS STANDARDS ORGANIZATION, https://www.ipso.co.u
k/IPSO/index.html (last visited Jan. 13, 2015).
97. See Greenslade, supra note 87 (noting appointment of outgoing appeals
court judge Sir Alan Moses as inaugural IPSO chair). Newspaper Society,
Appointment Panel Invites Applications for IPSO Chair Role, SOCIETY OF
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Promising that IPSO “will be a complete break with the
past, and will deliver all the key Leveson recommendations,”
the publishers offered constitutional documents. 98 A press
release declared that IPSO would have powers to impose fines
of up to £1 million for serious and systemic wrongdoing and
ensure that corrections and adjudications were published
“whether editors like it or not.” 99 IPSO has a majority of
independent members at every level, and no industry veto on
appointments. 100
Nevertheless, IPSO has attracted criticism as
insufficiently independent of publishers and insufficiently
distinct from the now-defunct PCC. 101 Critics devote much
attention to the funding structure of IPSO, which depends on
EDITORS (Feb. 6, 2014), available at http://www.newspapersoc.org.uk/06/fe
b/14/appointment-panel-invites-applications-for-ipso-chair-role. See also Mark
Sweney, Press regulator Ipso names its board, THE GUARDIAN (May 28, 2014),
available at http://www.theguardian.com/media/2014/may/28/press-regulatoripso-board-ros-altmann-charles-wilson.
98. See O’Carroll, supra note 94.
99. Id. The final Articles of Association, Regulations, and Financial
Sanctions Guidance Independent Press Standards Organization are available at
IPSO’s website. https://www.ipso.co.uk/IPSO/aboutipso.html.
100. See https://www.ipso.co.uk/IPSO/whoweare.html#Board.
There are
seven non-industry directors on IPSO’s board, with five publishing
representatives. See Articles of Association of Independent Press Standards
Organization C.I.C., ¶ 22.1, available at https://www.ipso.co.uk/ass
ets/1/IPSO_Articles_of_Association.pdf. See also Roy Greenslade, Publishers
advertise for chair of new press regulator, THE GUARDIAN (Feb. 3, 2014),
available at http://www.theguardian.com/media/greenslade/2014/feb/03/pressregulation-ipso. Former judge Sir Alan Moses is the inaugural chair of IPSO.
Lisa O’Carroll, Sir Alan Moses appointed as Ipso chair, THE GUARDIAN (Apr. 29,
2014), available at http://www.theguardian.com/media/2014/apr/29/sir-alanmoses-ipso-chair-pcc. The appointment of the Chair was made by the
Appointment Panel. Newspaper Society, supra note 97; Greenslade, supra note
87. The current members of the IPSO board are identified on the organization’s
website at https://www.ipso.co.uk/IPSO/whoweare.html#Board.
101. See, e.g., Jason Deans, Victims of press intrusion brand new regulator
Ipso
a sham, THE GUARDIAN
(Sept.
7, 2014),
available
at
http://www.theguardian.com/media/2014/sep/07/victims-press-regulator-ipsoleveson; Roy Greenslade, Press regulation déjà vu: ‘new’ Ipso and the old PCC
resemble each other, THE GUARDIAN (Nov. 4, 2014), available at
http://www.theguardian.com/media/greenslade/2014/nov/04/press-regulationipso; Martin Moore, New Appointments Further Increase IPSO’s Dependence on
Powerful Industry Figures, HUFFINGTON POST (Mar. 11, 2014), available at
http://www.huffingtonpost.co.uk/martin-moore/ipso_b_6081726.html (describing
representation of powerful publishers on IPSO’s funding board, the
appointment of the Editor of the Daily Mail as Chair of the Editors’ Code of
Practice Committee, the establishment of a new newspaper industry lobbying
group, and the structural limitations on IPSO’s independence, as characterized
by the Media Standards Trust, an organization with ties to Hacked Off).
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the major publishers, and to the role of IPSO’s funding
board—the Regulatory Funding Company (RFC)—in
approving key decisions. 102 Hacked Off is continuing its
campaign against the IPSO regime. 103
IPSO need not—and reportedly will not—seek
certification from the Royal Charter’s recognition body. 104 It
is unclear if IPSO would achieve official recognition even if it
were to do so. 105 In theory, this would leave publishers open
to threat of exemplary damages in libel and other mediarelated actions under the Crime and Courts Act 2013. But,
pursuant to statute, those provisions become effective only
upon the establishment of a recognized self-regulatory
body. 106 If IPSO is the only regulatory alternative, then
102. See, e.g., Moore, supra note 101.
103. See, e.g., Brian Cathcart, ‘New press regulator will result in more false
stories that victimise the weak’, THE GUARDIAN (May 31, 2014), available at
http://www.theguardian.com/media/2014/may/31/press-regulation-ipsonewspapers-media; Jamie Doward, Hacked Off says new press regulation body is
a
stitch-up,
THE
GUARDIAN
(Apr.
26,
2014),
available
at
http://www.theguardian.com/media/2014/apr/27/hacked-off-press-regulationbody-stitch-up-claim; Roy Greenslade, Hacked Off letter to Ipso chairman
attacks former Sun ombudsman, THE GUARDIAN (Sept. 8, 2014), available at
http://www.theguardian.com/media/greenslade/2014/sep/08/press-regulationhacked-off-campaign.
104. Lisa O’Carroll & Josh Halliday, Press still plans self-regulation despite
ministers’ rejection, says Times editor, THE GUARDIAN (Oct. 9, 2013), available
at http://www.theguardian.com/media/2013/oct/09/press-plans-self-regulationdespite-ministers-rejection-times-editor.
105. On the one hand, newspaper publishers have consistently claimed that
IPSO is structured to be Leveson-compliant. See, e.g., Michael Seamark, Tough
new Press watchdog set up in wake of Leveson Inquiry prepares for launch
within
months,
DAILY
MAIL
(Sept.
6,
2013),
available
at
http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2414732/Tough-new-Press-watchdogset-wake-Leveson-Inquiry-prepares-launch-months.html. On the other hand,
the IPSO structure has been criticized as a rebranding of the PCC, and noncompliant with a significant number of the Leveson Report’s recommendations.
See, e.g., Roy Greenslade, Ipso, the new press regulator, is just the PCC with
extra bells and whistles, THE GUARDIAN (Jan. 8, 2014), available at
http://www.theguardian.com/media/2014/jan/08/ipso-press-regulator-pcc-bellswhistles; MEDIA STANDARDS TRUST, IPSO: AN ASSESSMENT BY THE MEDIA
STANDARDS
TRUST
(Nov.
15,
2013),
available
at
http://mediastandardstrust.org/mst-news/ipso-an-assessment-by-the-mediastandards-trust/; see also Greenslade, supra note 86.
106. The Crime and Courts Act 2013 received Royal Assent on April 13, 2013.
Section 34 of the Act addresses exemplary damages and defines “relevant
publisher,” section 40 relates to costs, and section 42 provides that the
provisions would only apply if a regulator had been recognized by the
recognition body established by Royal Charter. Crime and Courts Act, 2013, c.
22,
pt.
2,
§§
34,
42
(U.K.),
available
at
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2013/22/contents/enacted.
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oversight of the press is likely to be at a standstill.
Consequently, an important question for IPSO’s future will be
its effectiveness at forestalling other self-regulatory
organizations from forming and seeking recognition body
certification.
Enter IMPRESS, the Independent Monitor for the Press,
launched in December 2013 as a “credible, compliant,
independent regulator.” 107 IMPRESS, whose asserted goal is
the development of a Leveson-compliant self-regulator “truly
independent of newspaper owners and politicians,” has been
endorsed by the National Union of Journalists 108 and
attracted the support of former Times editor Sir Harold
Evans. 109 Although IMPRESS has apparently obtained some
funding from the Joseph Rountree Foundation and some
public donations, no major publishers are reported to have
joined the initiative. 110 IMPRESS could emerge as a viable
self-regulator if it attracted the remaining unaligned
newspapers (such as The Guardian, The Independent, and the
Financial Times), as well as small publishers and online news
purveyors. 111 If IMPRESS sought Royal Charter certification,
107. WAN-IFRA, PRESS FREEDOM, supra note 4, at 18. See also Roy
Greenslade, Impress, the would-be alternative press regulator, appoints
chairman,
THE
GUARDIAN
(Nov.
4,
2014),
available
at
http://www.theguardian.com/media/greenslade/2014/nov/05/press-regulationnewspapers; IMPRESS PROJECT, IMPRESS moves another step closer to launch
(June 30, 2014), available at http://impressproject.org/2014/06/30/impressmoves-another-step-closer-to-launch/. The IMPRESS Project was formed in
2013 by Jonathan Heawood, a former director of English PEN. See Roy
Greenslade, Impress, a potential alternative to Ipso, takes a step towards
formation,
THE
GUARDIAN
(June
30,
2014),
available
at
http://www.theguardian.com/media/greenslade/2014/jun/30/press-regulationipso;
THE
GUARDIAN,
Jonathan
Heawood,
http://www.theguardian.com/profile/jonathanheawood (last visited Jan. 13,
2015) (describing Heawood); Jonathan Heawood, Why the Impress Project wants
to talk about press regulation, THE GUARDIAN (Dec. 9, 2013), available at
http://www.theguardian.com/media/2013/dec/08/impress-project-pressregulation-ipso.
108. Heawood, supra note 107; Greenslade, supra note 86.
109. IMPRESS
PROJECT,
The
IMPRESS
Project
Board,
http://impressproject.org (last visited Jan. 22, 2015).
110. Greenslade, supra note 86; Roy Greenslade, Impress versus Ipso - get
ready for another press regulation battle, THE GUARDIAN (Dec. 12, 2013),
available at http://www.theguardian.com/media/greenslade/2013/dec/12/pressregulation-hacked-off-campaign;
IMPRESS
PROJECT,
Prospectus,
http://impressproject.org/prospectus/ (last visited Jan. 13, 2015).
111. See, e.g., Greenslade, supra note 110. Cf. Martin Moore, The topsy-turvy
world of newspaper regulation and government spies, NEW STATESMEN (Nov. 25,
2013),
available
at
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it would trigger the exemplary damages provisions of the
Crime and Courts Act. Thus, like David slaying Goliath,
IMPRESS could derail the newspaper industry’s attempt to
freeze the Royal Charter’s review process. 112 Recently, and in
light of such an eventuality, the free speech and literature
charity English PEN released a report warning that the
Crimes and Courts Act legislation would have a significant
chilling effect on freedom of expression. 113
Against that background, members of the U.K.
government have attempted to pressure newspapers to
comply with the Royal Charter system, and constraints on
press access to information have begun to be put into place. 114

http://www.newstatesman.com/politics/2013/11/topsy%E2%80%93turvy-worldnewspaper-regulation-and-government-spies (making a similar point in the
context of an argument rejecting the amenability of the Royal Charter to
manipulation by politicians).
112. Some have wondered whether that might be one of the rationales for the
introduction of IMPRESS. Both Hacked Off representatives and Heawood have
denied that IMPRESS “was some kind of front organization for Hacked Off.”
Greenslade, supra note 110. Nevertheless, “it is obvious that Impress does
amount to a stalking horse for Hacked Off . . . .” Id.
113. HELEN ANTHONY, WHO JOINS THE REGULATOR? A REPORT ON THE
IMPACT OF THE CRIME AND COURTS ACT ON PUBLISHERS 3, ENGLISH PEN (Nov.
2014),
available
at
http://www.englishpen.org/campaigns/who-joins-theregulator/ (“ English PEN is concerned that the lack of consultation and
parliamentary debate surrounding the legislation and the Royal Charter has
resulted in a confused, contradictory and arbitrary series of definitions [of
‘relevant publisher’ under the legislation] and exemptions that will create
uncertainty and chill freedom of expression.”).
114. For example, Prime Minister David Cameron warned the press in a
speech that faced “hideous” statutory regulation if it chose not to participate in
the Royal Charter process. See Watt, supra note 9. Cameron is not alone.
Numerous members of the House of Commons Culture, Media and Sport Select
Committee “generated some heat” during a hearing in which they questioned
Lord Hunt, the present PCC Chair and proponent of IPSO. Greenslade, supra
note 86; Roy Greenslade, Hunt of the PCC sweats under fire from the Commons
Charterists,
THE
GUARDIAN
(Jan.
29,
2014),
available
at
http://www.theguardian.com/media/greenslade/2014/jan/29/press-regulationlord-hunt. Deputy Prime Minister Nick Clegg has publicly predicted high fines
for non-compliant newspapers. Rowena Mason & Andrew Sparrow, Press selfregulation without oversight may lead to higher fines, hints Clegg, THE
GUARDIAN
(Oct.
6,
2014),
available
at
http://www.theguardian.com/media/2014/oct/06/press-self-regulation-higherfines-ipso-clegg (“I think we should let this system run for a bit because these
incentives will increase over time. So let’s just give it a bit of time.”). The Daily
Mail Editor recently appealed for press unity in response, inter alia, to
“suggestions from some politicians that they will ‘finish what they began with
Leveson’ after the general election.” Press Association, Daily Mail editor: unite
to fight for press freedom, THE GUARDIAN (Oct. 28, 2014), available at
http://www.theguardian.com/media/2014/oct/28/daily-mail-editor-press-freedom-
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Should there be another tabloid debacle before the general
elections of 2015—and especially after the expenditure of
millions of pounds on the Leveson Inquiry—public opinion
might well force candidates to push for even more drastic
regulation. 115
In sum, the future of the Leveson Report’s
recommendations for press reform in the U.K. is currently
unsettled. Despite characterizations of British press reform
as at an impasse, 116 what seems certain is that something will
be done. 117
paul-dacre-ripa-eu
[hereinafter Press Association].
The Information
Commissioner’s Office released a draft for consultation.
INFORMATION
COMMISSIONER’S OFFICE, DATA PROTECTION AND JOURNALISM: A GUIDE FOR
THE
MEDIA
(2014),
available
at
https://ico.org.uk/media/fororganisations/documents/1552/data-protection-and-journalism-mediaguidance.pdf. Post-Leveson, U.K. police have been less forthcoming in naming
suspects and arrests. Roy Greenslade, Rolf Harris: Mail and Sun blame
Leveson inquiry for his ‘secret’ arrest, THE GUARDIAN (July 1, 2014), available at
http://www.theguardian.com/media/greenslade/2014/jul/01/ukcrime-nationalnewspapers (describing resulting chilling effect). The Government has also
begun consultations on press access restrictions in the context of data protection
and police relationships. See Peter Preston, Stephen Lawrence saga shows we
still need whistleblowers, THE GUARDIAN (Mar. 9, 2014), available at
http://www.theguardian.com/media/2014/mar/09/stephen-lawrence-sagawhistleblowers-undercover-policing-mail-guardian (“Now, after Leveson, police
channels of information are closed.”); Roy Greenslade, Journalists face
‘fundamental threat to freedom of expression’, says lawyer, THE GUARDIAN (July
8,
2014),
available
at
http://www.theguardian.com/media/greenslade/2014/jul/08/data-protectionprivacy (on new data-handling guidance now under consideration by the
Information Commissioner’s Office); Owen Bowcott, Secret hearings could allow
police to seize journalists’ notes if bill passes, THE GUARDIAN (Jan. 31, 2014),
available at http://www.theguardian.com/media/2014/jan/31/secret-hearingspolice-journalists-deregulation-bill; Roy Greenslade, David Cameron urged not
to water down the freedom of information act, THE GUARDIAN (Oct. 30, 2013),
available
at
http://www.theguardian.com/media/greenslade/2013/oct/30/freedomofinformatio
n-davidcameron; Roy Greenslade, Publishers fear threat to press freedom in new
criminal justice bill, THE GUARDIAN (June 5, 2014), available at
http://www.theguardian.com/media/greenslade/2014/jun/05/press-freedommedialaw. But see Owen Bowcott, Government drops plan to give attorney
general power over web news archives, THE GUARDIAN (June 30, 2014), available
at
http://www.theguardian.com/media/2014/jun/30/attorney-general-onlinenews-archives; Roy Greenslade, Supreme court ruling opens door to revelations
of secret information, THE GUARDIAN (Mar. 27, 2014), available at
http://www.theguardian.com/media/greenslade/2014/mar/27/medialaw-thetimes.
115. Cf. infra note 168.
116. See, e.g., WAN-IFRA, PRESS FREEDOM, supra note 4, at 10.
117. On the one hand, delay could arguably work in the newspapers’ favor.
See Damian Tambini, It’s 2014 and We’re Still Implementing Leveson Inquiry
Recommendations, LSE MEDIA POLICY PROJECT (Jan. 8, 2014), available at
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“A GRAVE ERROR”?: 118 WORRISOME ASPECTS OF THE
LEVESON UNDERTAKING

The Leveson approach to press regulation has been
characterized by many proponents as a moderate and
proportional response to the unsavory realities of the tabloid
press. 119 What at first glance might be modest and sensible,
however, is likely to have broad-ranging negative
consequences both for the British press and journalism
worldwide. 120 Without disputing that the British tabloid
press went too far in phone-hacking, blagging, and the rest of
the newsgathering “dark arts,” often violating existing law,
Leveson-based press regulation in Britain is likely to be
overly intrusive on the work of the press in the new media
age. 121 It is possible to address unlawful actions by the press

http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/mediapolicyproject/2014/01/08/its-2014-and-were-stillimplementing-leveson-inquiry-recommendations/ (“The closer the 2015
elections, the more the power balance shifts to the editors and owners. They
may be tempted to tough it out, even when the costs threat is a real one.”). On
the other hand, companies accountable to shareholders and concerned about
public opinion may “weigh risks . . . more prudently.” Id. And politicians would
find it very difficult to back off from Leveson after the expenditure of extensive
resources on the inquiry. Levi, supra note 6; Tambini, supra (“Whilst it is finely
balanced, no front bench politician, and least of all the Prime Minister, will
want to go into an election year with nothing at all to show for the Inquiry. The
total direct cost of the Leveson Inquiry was £5 442 400. This is likely to be a
fraction of the total cost of the inquiry, which heard evidence from 737
witnesses from government, media companies, the police and all sectors of
society. Many witnesses had senior legal and PR advice and representation,
much of the cost of which will have been borne by the public purse. And that
leaves out the lost productivity caused as the Inquiry was streamed into homes
and offices up and down the land.”).
118. The outgoing head of Ofcom, the regulator and competition authority for
the U.K.’s electronic communications industries, has publicly called any form of
statutory regulation of the press “a grave error.” See James Slack, Grave error
to gag the media, says head of Ofcom: Idea of statutory regulation leaves her
feeling ‘very nervous’, DAILY MAIL (Mar. 2, 2014), available at
http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2571758/Grave-error-gag-media-sayshead-Ofcom-Idea-statutory-regulation-leaves-feeling-nervous.html
(quoting
Colette Bowe, who also reported at the Oxford Media Convention that she was
“very, very nervous about any form of regulation near our press.”).
119. This Article focuses principally on the Leveson Report’s
recommendations because the Royal Charter incorporates twenty-three of them.
120. See infra pt. II, § E. See also WAN-IFRA, PRESS FREEDOM, supra note
4.
121. As The Guardian’s chief legal officer concluded: “What Leveson has
come up with is the worst of all worlds. His attempt to please everybody and
avoid being a dusty footnote on a shelf somewhere has led him down a road that
has proved to be pretty disastrous.” Gavriel Hollander, Leveson has been
‘disastrous’ says Guardian legal chief, PRESS GAZETTE (Sep. 18, 2013), available
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directly without effectively creating a new regime of press
licensing. Although the phone-hacking scandal served as the
trigger for the much broader regulatory debate, the two
should not be conflated. 122 And press regulation under the
Royal Charter cannot be addressed separately from the
British government’s unprecedented attempts to intimidate
national security reporting.
A. “Voluntary Self-Regulation” or “Licensing By Proxy?”
Even though press reform efforts in the U.K. are not
hampered by constitutional provisions such as the First
Amendment of the United States Constitution (under which
the Leveson option would fail in the United States), there
appears to be a British consensus that press licensing or
direct regulation of the press would not be acceptable. 123 So
the Royal Charter approach is self-consciously designed to
avoid state licensing and explicit government oversight of
journalistic content. Its proponents argue that press freedom
is adequately protected under the regime because
subscription to the self-regulatory body is voluntary, because
the Royal Charter cannot be amended without a supermajority vote, 124 and because the press regulator would exist
at
http://www.pressgazette.co.uk/leveson-has-been-disastrous-says-guardianlegal-chief. The approach is overly press-restrictive even in light of the British
press/privacy calculus, which is different from the calculus in the United States.
See infra note 158.
122. See WAN-IFRA, PRESS FREEDOM, supra note 4, at 18.
123. It is well to be reminded that different countries weigh the relative
importance of free press and reputational values differently, see David A.
Anderson, Transnational Libel, 53 VA. J. INT’L L. 71, 82 (2012), and so one
should not unthinkingly apply American free speech norms to the British
question. This Article argues that it is far from clear whether Lord Justice
Leveson’s complex solution in fact reflects the British balance. Even though the
U.K. does not have constitutional press protection, it is a signatory to the
European Convention on Human Rights, which protects press freedom under
Article 10. For an initial discussion of British press reform from the vantage
point of Article 10, see infra note 203.
124. The Royal Charter is said to be cloistered from political interference
because it can only be amended by a two-thirds supermajority vote in both
Houses of Parliament. Enterprise and Regulatory Reform Act, 2013, c. 24, pt. 6,
§ 96 (U.K.), available at http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2013/2
4/part/6/crossheading/royal-charters/enacted. Proponents assert that “[t]he
Charter insulates the press from political interference to a degree not seen
before.” Brian Cathcart, Why the big newspaper groups hate the Royal Charter,
INFORRM’S
BLOG
(Oct.
25,
2013),
available
at
http://inforrm.wordpress.com/2013/10/25/why-the-big-newspaper-groups-hatethe-royal-charter-brian-cathcart/.
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as a private entity established by the newspapers
themselves. 125 Accordingly, the initial question is whether—
by making participation voluntary and state involvement
indirect—the Leveson approach can side-step the harms of
press licensing and direct state oversight. 126
A major stumbling block is that the regime will not be
truly voluntary in practice. Because the system is unlikely to
work without the participation of the major players in the
newspaper industry, it is structured to create significant
pressures to participate. Small publishers with slender
purses would obviously perceive those pressures as directly
coercive, but they are not alone.
Large, well-heeled
publishers as well would likely feel compelled to join a
certified regulator lest they be inundated with multi-million
dollar lawsuits—with the possibility of high exemplary
damages and costs obligations—for media torts. 127 Moreover,
government officials have threatened statutory press
regulation if the press does not accept the Leveson-inspired
Realistically, then, newspapers will be
approach. 128
compelled to join a certified regulator, if one is established. 129
Once they submit themselves to the authority of the selfregulatory body, the newspapers will be vulnerable to “proxy
licensing once removed”—where a government-established
entity will have the discretion to refuse certification or re125. That a self-regulatory entity is to be subject to oversight by a
government-appointed body is not, as such, rare in the United Kingdom (and
Europe), where co-regulation is not unusual in other industries.
126. In the United States, the press is seen as a special, and constitutionally
protected business.
See generally C. Edwin Baker, The Independent
Significance of the Press Clause Under Existing Law, 35 HOFSTRA L. REV. 955
(2007).
127. The history of high defamation awards in Britain would no doubt figure
in their deliberations on the question. Libel reform under the Defamation Act,
2013 is not likely to reduce significantly those papers’ concerns about extensive
financial exposure in both defamation and privacy-related cases.
128. See Nicholas Watt & Josh Halliday, Maria Miller tells press: agree to
charter or face worse, THE GUARDIAN (Oct 11, 2013), available at
http://www.theguardian.com/politics/2013/oct/11/maria-miller-warning-presscharter-regulation (The government has given the newspaper industry a
warning “that it risks being subject to full statutory regulation if it refuses to
accept the royal charter.”); see also supra note 9 (referring to David Cameron’s
invocation of “hideous” statutory regulation absent press compliance with Royal
Charter).
129. They would be subject to the sanctions imposed over their practices by
the regulator. And whatever the sanction, any news organization that did not
comply with the regulator’s ruling would potentially be subject to having the
regulator’s finding used in a private lawsuit.
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certification of a “voluntary” self-regulatory entity as an
approved regulator if it is not deemed to satisfy the
recognition body’s substantive and procedural criteria.
Notably, much like a licensing scheme, the Royal Charter
Recognition Panel will engage in both cyclical and ad hoc
reviews of whether the recognized press Regulator is
continuing to meet the Royal Charter’s Leveson-based
recognition criteria. 130
Arguably, this is tantamount to statutory regulation at a
remove—where the government will use private parties to
achieve its aims indirectly. Even though the recognition body
will not directly run the operations of the self-regulatory
entity, its oversight and monitoring roles under the Charter
will inevitably create incentives for self-regulation—at two
levels—in harmony with the substantive standards approved
by the government-established body. We can expect the selfregulatory body to regulate with a view to satisfying the
explicit or tacit requirements of its certifying entity. And, in
turn, the newspaper members of the press self-regulator
would have significant incentives to self-censor so as to avoid
extensive potential sanctions from their self-regulatory body.
Assurances that the press regulator would not have the
power to prevent publication cannot gainsay these layers of
likely self-censorship. 131 So the Royal Charter, by holding the
press’ self-regulatory entity hostage to the cyclical and ad hoc
review power of the recognition body, could well achieve
results akin to licensing indirectly, without formally
accrediting the press. Only two degrees of separation would
exist between the government and the operations of
particular newspapers.
The ongoing certification requirement and the
Recognition Body’s ad hoc review authority mean that
newspapers will continuously operate under the threat of
130. Under the Royal Charter, the self-regulatory body is subject not only to
cyclical reviews by the recognition body according to a statutory schedule (in
order to assure that it continues to satisfy the twenty-three recognition criteria
established in the Charter), but also to ad hoc reviews whenever the board of
the recognition panel thinks it is in the public interest. The recognition factors
are grounded on the Leveson Report’s recommendations. Royal Charter, supra
note 60, ¶ 10. The board’s ad hoc review power is triggered if it thinks that
there are “exceptional circumstances” calling for ad hoc review, including
“serious breaches of the recognition criteria.” Id. at ¶ 8.
131. See LEVESON REPORT, supra note 7; Royal Charter, supra note 60,
sched. 3, ¶ 17.
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compelled self-justification. In addition, the very numerosity
of the Leveson-based criteria to be assessed by the
Recognition body gives the body extensive discretion. The
discretion to hold the regulator hostage to any one of twentythree different recognition requirements virtually ensures
that the Recognition body could find some element of noncompliance if it wished to do so. 132 Moreover, the regime will
likely lead to one or a few self-regulatory bodies seeking
certification. In the absence of greater competition among
such bodies, the Recognition body could more easily funnel
standardizing norms through its relicensing process.
Because of their threats to press freedom, hybrid models
of self-regulation or meta-regulation used in Britain in other
contexts should not be applied in the press context. 133
B. State Insulation or “Crossing the Rubicon?” 134
Proponents of indirect press regulation argue that the
regulatory structure was precisely designed to insulate the
press’ regulator from politics and government. Yet Charter
opponents argue that this is not enough—either in principle
or in practice.
First, opponents claim that even though the Royal
Charter is not the direct equivalent of full state press control,
any form of state input—including a Royal Charter initially
crafted to insulate press regulation from state control—would
still have crossed “the psychological barrier to state action.” 135
Whether directly through the “front door of Westminster” or

132. Royal Charter, supra note 60, sched. 3.
133. See Adam Tucker, Press Regulation and the Royal Prerogative (Nov. 8,
2013), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2347375
(categorizing the Royal Charter as meta-regulation). For discussion of metaregulation (audited self-regulation), see, for example, Cary Coglianese & Evan
Mendelson, Meta-Regulation and Self-Regulation, in THE OXFORD BOOK OF
REGULATION (Robert Baldwin et al eds., 2010).
134. Patrick Wintour & Dan Sabbagh, Leveson report: David Cameron refuses
to ‘cross Rubicon’ and write press law, THE GUARDIAN, Nov. 29, 2012, available
at
http://www.theguardian.com/media/2012/nov/29/david-cameron-refuses-towrite-press-law (quoting Prime Minister David Cameron’s description of
statutory press regulation).
135. Jacob Rowbottom, Leveson, press freedom and the watchdogs, RENEWAL,
vol.
21,
no.
1
(Apr.
23,
2013),
available
at
http://www.renewal.org.uk/articles/leveson-press-freedom-and-the-watchdogs/;
WAN-IFRA, PRESS FREEDOM, supra note 4, at 13. For an argument that the
Royal Charter approach is an ultra vires exercise of prerogative power, see
Tucker, supra note 133.
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“the back door of Buckingham Palace[,]” the Royal Charter
system has “introduced an element of political influence—no
matter how distant—into the control of the press.” 136 For
those who are principally concerned about protecting the
press against state power, direct and indirect regulations are
both unpalatable.
Critics of Leveson and the Royal Charter also question
the effectiveness of the effort to insulate the Royal Charter
process from Parliamentary or executive end-run. This is
because, they claim, the super-majority amendment
requirement does not necessarily eliminate pressure on the
press to self-censor. 137 Depending on circumstances, cobbling
together political supermajorities to change the Royal
Charter is not inconceivable. 138
Although the Enterprise and Regulatory Reform Act
provision is designed as a “protection ‘lock’” 139 against passing
more stringent press regulation, it in fact opens the door to
statutory controls that did not exist previously. 140 If another
press scandal akin to the phone hacking scandal comes to
light, or if investigative reporting on Parliament cuts too close
to the bone, and if members of Parliament feel public
pressure to muzzle the press, then we can anticipate acrossthe-aisle political agreements that might head toward
supermajority amendment. 141 At a minimum, the recognition
136. Editorial, Media regulation: a royal seal, with no deal, THE GUARDIAN
(Oct.
28,
2013),
available
at
http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2013/oct/28/media-regulation-royalcharter-press. The Guardian editorial makes clear that because the Privy
Council consists of ministers from the “government of the day,” the Royal
Charter option simply replaces one set of political influences (Parliament) with
another (Ministers).
137. See infra pt. II, § D.
138. See Telegraph View, The fight goes on for press freedom, TELEGRAPH
(Oct. 30, 2013), available at http://www.telegraph.co.uk/comment/telegraphview/10415103/The-fight-goes-on-forpress-freedom.html (“Such a scenario is not
unimaginable. The Guardian’s recent investigation into state spying is exactly
the kind of reporting that could spark a moral panic among politicians and give
them cause to limit what the press can publish. If Parliament can find the
numbers to impose a royal charter upon the industry, it can also find the
numbers necessary to censor it.”).
139. WAN-IFRA, PRESS FREEDOM, supra note 4, at 15.
140. Id. So long as Parliament had a two-thirds majority, it could “vote for
stronger controls over regulation.” Id.
141. The Sunday Times wrote about the two-thirds majority provision that
“[i]t is in fact an open invitation to future politicians to restrain the press from
exposing the secrets of the powerful. It is easy to imagine such a majority being
constructed in the grip of a moral panic. Anyone who thinks the press is
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body created under the auspices of the Royal Charter may
fear such developments and therefore have an incentive to
regulate in order to avoid them. In addition, clever ways to
avoid the limits have already been imagined. 142 Press
organizations seeking change in the Royal Charter regime
would be constrained to lobby a two-thirds Parliamentary
majority to do so, while a future Government seeking to
eliminate the super-majority requirement might simply
repeal the legislation by majority vote. 143 Moreover, as some
have argued, the super-majority requirement might undercut
its own goals. 144
overreacting should consider blatant attempts made by government aides last
year to intimidate The Daily Telegraph over its investigation into the expenses
of Maria Miller, the Culture Secretary.” WAN-IFRA, PRESS FREEDOM, supra
note 4, at 15 (quoting editorial).
142. In addition, the two-thirds Parliamentary vote requirement for Charter
amendment might be evaded precisely because royal charters are capable of
being issued by the monarch, on the Prime Minister’s advice, without reference
to Parliament. Thus, it is possible that the monarch could issue an entirely new
charter regulating the press, so long as it does not purport to amend the
previous one subject to the supermajority amendment requirement. See Jacob
Rees-Mogg, Royal charter: The press must resist this assault on liberty,
TELEGRAPH
(Mar.
26,
2013),
available
at
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/leveson-inquiry/9954913/Royalcharter-The-press-must-resist-this-assault-on-liberty.html.
For
another
argument that proceeding with press regulation by Royal Charter, even if it
protected against subsequent amendment by the executive, would still permit
legislative overriding, see Rowbottom, supra note 135. There is also a
reasonable argument that the operations of a press regulatory system under
Royal Charter would also be less transparent than if accomplished via statute.
Id.
143. See WAN-IFRA, PRESS FREEDOM, supra note 4, at 15–16. Might Section
96 of the Enterprise and Regulatory Reform Act, 2013 itself be amended by a
majority Parliamentary vote, even if the Parliamentary two-thirds vote
requirement in the Royal Charter cannot be? See Andrew Gilligan, Royal
charter: The men who want to kill our free press, TELEGRAPH (Mar. 24, 2013),
available at http://www.telegraph.co.uk/comment/9949855/Royal-charter-Themen-who-want-to-kill-our-free-press.html.
144. The press regulation Royal Charter is likely to need amendment over
time, as the media landscape changes. Because such amendment will require
political super-majorities across party lines, the need for super-majorities might
“forc[e] the press into the kind of give-and-take relationship with politicians so
familiar in the statute-regulated world of broadcasting.” Steve Hewlett, Could
the royal charter force the press into political haggling?, THE GUARDIAN (Nov.
10,
2013),
available
at
http://www.theguardian.com/media/mediablog/2013/nov/10/press-regulation-royal-charter. Other Royal Charter opponents
have worried that the supermajority requirement could potentially protect a
regulator hostile to the press from being removed. See Rees-Mogg, supra note
142 (“The ultimate person in charge of the recognition body’s members is the
Commissioner for Public Appointments. The Crown selects him, so it is
conceivable that a government could appoint someone hostile to the press in an
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C. Shifting Power
Proponents of statutory press regulation have argued
that journalism and the public interest need protection
against the power of private entities, including powerful
newspaper publishers. Some ground their position on the
central role played by Rupert Murdoch and his News of the
World newspaper both in the phone-hacking scandal, and—
and more importantly—in the British political environment
since the Thatcher days. 145 Revelations of former Prime
Minister Tony Blair’s role in advising former News of the
World Editor Rebekah Brooks add to the concerns about
improper closeness of press barons and politicians. 146 To the
extent that regulation would undermine that kind of outside
political influence, it would arguably be democracyenhancing.
However, the time for the moderate version of the
watchdog role is long gone. Whatever one might say about
the balance between government and corporate—indeed,
press—power in the late twentieth century, it is significantly
effort to stiffen control. It would then be harder for a successor government to
restore press freedom.”).
145. It is true that the Leveson Report characterizes the problem as part of
the shared journalistic culture in British newspapers, and admittedly criminal
investigations are now revealing phone hacking and other law-violating activity
by tabloids other than NEWS OF THE WORLD. But it is not inconceivable that
the Murdoch organization was a prime mover whose activities then lead to a
snowballing effect as a result of competition. Many in Britain believe that the
popular press—especially the Murdoch papers—“has had an improper armlock
on the political class—both Labour and Conservative.” See John Lloyd, The
Two Cultures, in MEDIA AND PUBLIC SHAMING: DRAWING THE BOUNDARIES OF
DISCLOSURE 218 (Julian Petley ed., 2013). While Murdoch has antecedents in
Britain’s famously powerful press barons of the early twentieth century, he
succeeded in turning News Corporation from an ordinary news company into a
global conglomerate using its press capabilities as a way of seeking influence.
Jay Rosen, Phone hacking crisis shows News Corp is no ordinary news company,
THE
GUARDIAN
(July
19,
2011),
available
at
http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/cifamerica/2011/jul/19/rupertmurdoch-phone-hacking. The Leveson Inquiry itself uncovered significantly
cozy relationships between Murdoch, his NEWS OF THE WORLD editors, and the
British Government. For a recent example, former NEWS OF THE WORLD editor
Andy Coulson served as the communications director for David Cameron.
Burns, supra note 5. British media analysts conclude that “[i]f the political
class is or was to a significant extent in thrall to the Murdoch press, that is
clearly a reason for real concern.” Lloyd, supra, at 219.
146. See, e.g., Lisa O’Carroll, Tony Blair advised Rebekah Brooks on phonehacking scandal, court hears, THE GUARDIAN (Feb. 19, 2014), available at
http://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2014/feb/19/tony-blair-rebekah-brooksphone-hacking.
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different today. Looking to government—or to government
hand-in-hand with nominally private parties—to curb private
press power is a mistaken strategy both because of the
diminution of private press power, and because of the
increasing threat of government power (and government
power wielded in collusion with private power) over free
speech today.
1. The Murdoch Factor
With respect to the Murdoch factor, it does not deny
Murdoch’s past influence to note that Prime Minister Tony
Blair’s “feral beasts” are now mostly notable for their “ebbing
power.” 147 Politicians have myriad ways to reach the voting
public directly, circulation figures even for the national
papers are down dramatically, and the press itself is
reporting that the newspapers’ grip on the national political
Murdoch himself has been a
debate is slipping. 148
beleaguered figure since the News of the World scandal. 149

147. THE ECONOMIST, Twilight of the scribblers? Fleet Street’s diminishing
power underlies the fight over press regulation (Oct. 12, 2013), available at
http://www.economist.com/news/britain/21587801-fleet-streets-diminishingpower-underlies-fight-over-press-regulation-twilight.
See also Bernhold &
Cowell, supra note 7 (quoting John Lloyd, co-founder of the Reuters Institute for
the Study of Journalism at Oxford, for the proposition that the tabloids “are
losing power all the time.”).
148. THE ECONOMIST, supra note 147.
149. According to a recent report, Scotland Yard intends to question Murdoch
“under caution” about crime at his newspapers. Nick Davies, Rupert Murdoch:
Scotland Yard want interview about crime at his UK papers, THE GUARDIAN
(June
24,
2014),
available
at
http://www.theguardian.com/uknews/2014/jun/24/scotland-yard-want-interview-rupert-murdoch-phone-hacking.
There has also been talk about American prosecution of News Corp. for
violations of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act on the grounds of NEWS OF THE
WORLD’s police bribery practices. See Ravi Somaiya, After 7 Years, No End in
Sight to Phone Hacking Scandal, N.Y. TIMES (May 16, 2012), available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/05/17/world/europe/no-end-in-sight-to-inquiryinto-murdochs-media-empire.html. Indeed, a campaign to push for such
prosecution seems to be the raison d’etre of http://www.prosecutenewscorp.com/.
News Corp. has been split into two, separating the news and entertainment
parts of the company. Amy Chozick, Shareholders Approve Plan to Split News
Corp.,
N.Y.
TIMES
(June
11,
2013),
available
at
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/12/business/media/shareholders-approve-planto-split-news-corp.html?ref=rupertmurdoch. Huge numbers of civil suits have
been brought over phone hacking. See Ravi Somaiya, News Corp. Slowly
Putting Phone-Hacking Scandal Behind It, N.Y. TIMES (June 29, 2014),
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2014/06/30/business/media/news-corpslowly-putting-phone-hacking-scandal-behind-it.html?_r=0 (noting that News
Corp. has settled 718 claims related to phone-hacking).
Even activist
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Query whether Leveson’s implicit focus on Murdoch as the
raison d’etre for an unethical British press culture is an
example of misplaced focus in the modern press context. 150
The market conditions that permitted the twentieth century
press barons and Murdoch’s News Corporation to accumulate
vast power are fast fading. Moreover, without Murdoch, the
state of the remaining British newspaper press is unlikely to
lead to the same kind of influence. Given that much of the
press power decried by regulation proponents came from the
mutually reinforcing relationships of the press titans with
politicians, reductions in the salience of the press inevitably
shift the balance of power between those two groups. 151

shareholders sued the News Corp. board for violations of fiduciary duty in
permitting Murdoch to run the company like a fiefdom, withdrawing the suit in
exchange for a $139 million settlement. Dominic Rushe & Mark Sweney, News
Corp reaches settlement with shareholders, THE GUARDIAN (Apr. 22, 2013),
available at http://www.theguardian.com/media/2013/apr/22/news-corp-reachessettlement-shareholders. One blog headline in THE GUARDIAN—“The Rupert
Murdoch era is all but over”—discusses the waning power of the press in
general and Murdoch in particular. Steve Hewlett, The Rupert Murdoch era is
all
but
over,
THE
GUARDIAN
(Jan.
5,
2014),
available
at
http://www.theguardian.com/media/media-blog/2014/jan/05/rupert-murdoch-eraover. Cf. Peter Preston, Once humbled, but now risen: the Murdochs march
ahead,
THE
GUARDIAN
(June
28,
2014),
available
at
http://www.theguardian.com/media/2014/jun/29/rupert-murdoch-humbled-nowmarch-ahead (noting that “Murdoch certainly has his swagger back, if not his
reputation and influence.”); Somayia, News Corp. Slowly Putting PhoneHacking Scandal Behind It, supra (noting financial benefit of News Corporation
split).
150. Even if that is too optimistic an assessment, neither the Murdoch
phenomenon nor the sensationalist character of the tabloids suffices to justify
the multi-layered structure of press reform envisioned in the Leveson Report.
To the extent that the U.K. press problem is attributable to the influenceseeking behavior of the Murdoch organization and its malign influence
elsewhere in the media sector, then query whether other ownership limits, for
example, might serve as more effective and targeted solutions than the Leveson
Inquiry’s preferred bureaucratic structures? Media ownership rules could
potentially offer an alternative more sensitive to press values.
151. It might be argued that the diminishing economic security of the press
will lead to increased misbehavior, thereby justifying regulation. Arguably,
phone-hacking itself resulted from ruthless competition in an industry that is
both democratically necessary and financially in free-fall. See generally Tim
Luckhurst, Missing the Target and Spurning the Prize in THE PHONE HACKING
S CANDAL : JOURNALISM ON T RIAL (Richard Lance Keeble & John Mair, eds.
2012) (arguing against press regulation and contending that hacking occurred
in a context of ruthless competition that often drove journalists to break rules);
Cf. Lyrissa B. Lidsky, Prying, Spying and Lying: Media Intrusions and What
the Law Should Do About Them, 73 TUL. L. REV. 173, 179 (1998) (attributing
increases in media intrusions to competition). But the misbehavior could be
controlled through means other than overarching attempts to promote
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2. Hacked Off and Fears of Increased Media
Irresponsibility
Proponents of the Leveson-recommended independent
regulatory structure argue that, whatever its hypothetical
dangers, it is preferable to the alternative: publishers whose
economic incentives to sensationalize coverage and cut
corners will inevitably undermine truly voluntary selfAdmittedly, reduced resources, fierce
regulation. 152
competition, and the 24-hour news cycle have already led
many news purveyors down the path to sensational,
overwrought, inaccurate, acontextual, and “he said-she said”
reporting. 153 Victim groups such as Hacked Off predict
continuous declines in press ethics in the absence of effective
regulation. 154 Critics worry that things will only deteriorate,
as participants in the digital Fourth Estate do not all
necessarily share the professional journalistic norms and
practices of the traditional, high-brow institutional press of
the twentieth century. 155 On this view, moderate press
regulation such as the Leveson approach, while perhaps
inconsistent with a strong version of the watchdog
“voluntary” regulation. Moreover, query whether the diversity of press outlets
in the digital Fourth Estate, even enabling misbehavior, could also enhance
accountability?
152. See, e.g., Rowbottom, supra note 135.
153. Criticism of the current media and its coverage incentives is legion.
Popular books of that stripe include HOWARD ROSENBERG & CHARLES S.
FELDMAN, NO TIME TO THINK (2008); For critiques of “he said she said”
journalism (referring to reports in which journalists report polarized extremes
on factually verifiable matters without attempting to assess truth claims), see,
for example, Jay Rosen, He Said, She Said Journalism: Lame Formula in the
Land of the Active User, PRESSTHINK, (Apr. 12, 2009), available at
http://archive.pressthink.org/2009/04/12/hesaid_shesaid.html;
Linda
Greenhouse, Challenging ‘He Said, She Said’ Journalism, NEIMAN REPORTS,
(July
6,
2012),
available
at
http://www.nieman.harvard.edu/reports/article/102769/Challenging-He-Said—
She-Said-Journalism/.
154. Hacked Off and its supporters have pointed to what they take to be postLeveson press failures. See, e.g., Greenslade, supra note 103; Brooks Newmark
Complaint is Dropped. So What About IPSO?, HACKED OFF, (Oct. 21, 2014),
available at http://hackinginquiry.org/comment/brooks-newmark-complaint-isdropped-so-what-about-ipso/(discussing tabloid sex sting involving MPs). See
also Gerry McCann, Leveson Has Changed Nothing–The Media Still Put
‘Stories’ Before The Truth, THE GUARDIAN, (Oct. 2, 2014), available at
http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2014/oct/02/leveson-gerry-mccannmedia-stories-before-truth (critique of newspaper coverage by parent of
disappeared toddler Madeleine McCann).
155. See infra, pt. F. See also AMY GAJDA, THE FIRST AMENDMENT BUBBLE:
HOW PRIVACY AND PAPARAZZI THREATEN A FREE PRESS (2015).
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justification for a free press, should be deemed consistent
with a moderate form of the watchdog argument. 156
Predictions of further large-scale press misbehavior are
not necessarily accurate, however. Indeed, there may be
aspects to the evolving media landscape that will lead to
increased accuracy and accountability. 157 Moreover, there
may be much less intrusive ways of addressing tabloid
excesses than an overarching regulatory system such as that
contemplated under the Royal Charter. 158
More significantly, complaints about media excess and
warnings of future journalistic irresponsibility are far from
new. What makes movements for journalistic accountability
particularly credible and effective now, however, is the
diminution in the power, status, and cohesion of the
institutional press today. The phone hacking scandal and
other press misbehavior in fact worked to reduce the status
and power of the press and to mobilize public opinion against
British tabloids. Explaining phone hacking by reference to
the pressures created by the diminution in the press’ fortunes
does not negate the shift in the power relationship between
politicians and the press. The press’ power is inevitably
reduced as politicians both fear and need the press less. It is
no surprise that calls for press regulation have begun to
gather momentum at the very moment that technology and
economics have upended the twentieth century business
model—and concomitant power—of traditional news
Warnings about increased press
organizations. 159
irresponsibility serve as convenient and under-examined

156. See, e.g., Rowbottom, supra note 135 (distinguishing between strong and
moderate versions of the watchdog justification for press freedom).
157. See infra, text accompanying note 281.
158. For example, more effective regulation of wiretapping, trespassing,
phone hacking and other intrusive newsgathering techniques, and even the
recognition of a privacy tort as such could constitute more balanced and tailored
responses to journalistic misbehavior. Ultimately, less restrictive alternatives
are available to control the worst of the tabloids’ problematic newsgathering
behavior. If the Leveson Report’s only goal were to minimize violations of
criminal law by the press, it could certainly have achieved that by far less
editorially-intrusive means.
159. This proposition is by now so commonly accepted as to require no
extensive support. See, e.g., Leonard Downie, Jr. & Michael Schudson, The
Reconstruction of American Journalism, COLUMBIA JOURNALISM REVIEW,
Leonard Downie, Jr. & Michael Schudson, The Reconstruction of American
Journalism, 28 (October 19, 2009); Lili Levi, Social Media and the Press, 90
N.C. L. REV. 1531, 1536–47 (2012) and sources cited therein.
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excuses for powerful non-press actors to tether the watchdog
press.
3. The Surveillance State and The Guardian’s Snowden
Woes
The diminution in press power described above is
accompanied by increasing use of state power to intimidate
the press and public. Whatever our concerns about abuse of
private power, the reality of the era of the surveillance state
is that protection from government (and particularly
government in combination with private power) should have
primary salience. 160 The continuing saga of The Guardian’s
news coverage based on NSA contractor Edward Snowden’s
leaked national security documents serves as an object lesson
here.
Against the backdrop of ongoing press reform, the British
government has been actively seeking to constrain The
Guardian’s reporting of these materials. 161 From effectively
requiring The Guardian to destroy computer hard drives
containing Snowden material, 162 to detaining journalist Glenn
Greenwald’s partner at Heathrow airport, 163 to subjecting
Guardian Editor Alan Rusbridger to Parliamentary
committee testimony in which he was asked whether he loved
Britain, 164 to making public assertions that the paper’s
reporting was definitively harming national security, 165 the

160. Jack Balkin has argued that “the greatest threat to freedom of speech
today is not simply that of public power or private power. It is their potent
combination.” Jack M. Balkin, The First Amendment Is An Information Policy,
41 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1, 28 (2012).
161. WAN-IFRA, PRESS FREEDOM, supra note 4, at 19–26.
162. See, e.g., Luke Harding, Footage Released Of Guardian Editors
Destroying Snowden Hard Drives, THE GUARDIAN, (Jan. 31, 2014), available at
http://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2014/jan/31/footage-released-guardianeditors-snowden-hard-drives-gchq.
163. See, e.g., Owen Bowcott, David Miranda Lawyers Argue That Heathrow
Detention Was Unlawful, THE GUARDIAN, (Nov. 6, 2013), available at
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/nov/06/david-miranda-lawyersheathrow-detention-high-court.
164. See, e.g., Jack Mirkinson & Alan Rusbridger Got Asked Some Ridiculous
Questions At Parliamentary Hearing, HUFFINGTON POST, (Dec. 3, 2013),
available
at
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/12/03/alan-rusbridgerparliament-questioning-ridiculous_n_4377928.html.
165. See, e.g., James Slack, Guardian Has Handed A Gift To Terrorists’,
Warns MI5 Chief: Left-Wing Paper’s Leaks Caused ‘Greatest Damage To Western
Security In History’ Say Whitehall Insiders, DAILY MAIL, (Oct. 8, 2013), available
at
http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2450237/MI5-chief-Andrew-Parke-
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U.K. government has threatened The Guardian’s political
reporting on numerous fronts. It has deployed the rhetoric of
terrorism as a lever to control press coverage of national
security matters.
The Government’s actions have been
characterized as “an unprecedented level of political
interference in the freedom of the press . . . .” 166 They are
doubtless calculated acts of intimidation.
In addition to the Royal Charter regulatory regime and
direct government censorship of national security reporting,
press watchdogs have identified potential misuses of DAnotices, 167 journalist arrests, proposed changes to legal
safeguards for journalistic materials, proposed Internet
legislation, and threats to change data protection legislation
to reduce protections for journalistic activity as additional
concerns for press freedom in the U.K. 168
Whatever the asserted power of the press, this kind of
coordinated and blatant state effort to censor reporting on
government’s activities is directly threatening and far more
worrisome than the waning power of the traditional tabloid
press.
Moreover, some have argued that media serve as a
significant element in a new model of separation of powers
that can serve to constrain executive power. 169 If that is the
case, then all the more reason to be concerned about chilling
effects on the media (and on the leaks on which they often
rely).
The national security state can undermine the
The-Guardian-handed-gift-terrorists.html (recounting MI5 chief’s claims that
the Guardian’s reporting helped terrorists).
166. WAN-IFRA, PRESS FREEDOM, supra note 4, at 23.
167. DA-Notices—Defense Advisory Notices—are official governmental
requests to publishers and broadcasters not to publish information for reasons
of national security. See Frequently Asked Questions, THE DA-NOTICE SYSTEM,
(2012), http://www.dnotice.org.uk/faqs.htm (for a UK government description of
the notices).
168. Frequently Asked Questions, THE DA-NOTICE SYSTEM, (2012),
http://www.dnotice.org.uk/faqs.htm. Revelations last fall of police accessing
journalists’ phones without judicial review prompted an outcry for reform of
RIPA, the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000. Patrick Wintour,
British Police’s Use Of Ripa Powers To Snoop On Journalists To Be Reined In,
THE
GUARDIAN,
(Oct.
12,
2014),
available
at
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/oct/12/police-ripa-powers-journalistssurveillance.
169. See, e.g., JACK GOLDSMITH, POWER AND CONSTRAINT: THE
ACCOUNTABLE PRESIDENCY AFTER 9/11 (2012) (arguing, inter alia, that an
aggressive press, a watchful public and the legalization of warfare can serve in
combination to constrain executive power).
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effectiveness of the “stochastic mélange” 170 on whose success
the “new” separation of powers rests.
4. A Divided Press
Government attempts to intimidate the press need not be
direct. Last fall, a number of major tabloid newspapers
joined public officials in criticizing The Guardian for its
Why have rival publishers been
Snowden reporting. 171
critical or silent, despite “the apparent need for solidarity
within the media fraternity”? 172 Whatever its competitive
origins, this fissure in the press ranks cannot but be read
against the backdrop of press regulation.
At a minimum, the papers’ positions can be said to send
multiple messages. The more right-leaning tabloids might
have criticized The Guardian because of their ideological and
substantive disagreements on national security issues with
the left-sympathetic Guardian. 173 Or they might be reluctant
to support the newspaper responsible for breaking the phone
hacking story. 174 Or they might have seen an opportunity in
the controversy to boost short-term readership.
But,
regardless of ideological position, surely they recognized that
the government’s high-handed tactics vis-à-vis their press
colleagues endangered the press as a whole. Editors worldwide came to The Guardian’s defense. 175 So it can be
170. Neal K. Katyal, Stochastic Constraint, 126 HARV. L. REV. 990, 991
(2013).
171. For examples of articles criticizing The Guardian for its Snowden
coverage, see, for example, Chris Blackhurst, Edward Snowden’s Secrets May
Be Dangerous. I Would Not Have Published Them, THE INDEPENDENT, (Oct. 13,
2013), available at http://www.independent.co.uk/voices/comment/edwardsnowdens-secrets-may-be-dangerous-i-would-not-have-published-them8877404.html; Daily Mail Comment, The Paper That Helps Britain’s Enemies,
DAILY
MAIL,
(Oct.
9,
2013),
available
at
http://www.dailymail.co.uk/debate/article-2451557/Daily-Mail-Comment-TheGuardian-paper-helps-Britains-enemies.html; Rod Liddle, Guardian Treason
Helping
Terrorists,
THE
SUN,
(Oct.
10,
2013),
available
at
http://www.thesun.co.uk/sol/homepage/suncolumnists/rodliddle/5192001/Guardi
an-treason-is-helping-terrorists.html.
172. WAN-IFRA, PRESS FREEDOM, supra note 4 at 23.
173. See WAN-IFRA, PRESS FREEDOM, supra note 4 at 23.
174. Id.
175. See, e.g., Carl Bernstein, An Open Letter From Carl Bernstein To
Guardian Editor Alan Rusbridger, THE GUARDIAN, (Dec. 3, 2013), available at
http://www.theguardian.com/media/2013/dec/03/open-letter-carl-bernstein-alanrusbridger; Editors On The NSA Files: ‘What The Guardian Is Doing Is
Important For Democracy’, THE GUARDIAN, (Oct. 11, 2013), available at
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/oct/10/guardian-democracy-editors.
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surmised that these newspapers, so heavily criticized by the
Leveson Inquiry and inclined to resist complying with the
Royal Charter on press reform, had incentives to signal
submission to the state with respect to issues publicly
identified as critical by the government. 176
It would be naïve to think of these as isolated
developments unrelated to looming press regulation and the
alteration in power of the institutional press. All this
highlights the acute character of the dangers facing the press
in performing its checking function today.
5. The Power Impacts of Institutional Selectivity
It is no surprise that, after the Leveson Report was
issued, revelations of phone-hacking by a wide swath of other,
non-press institutions—including corporations, banks, and
lawyers—led to public outrage, press crowing, and criticism of
Justice Leveson’s laser-like focus on the press in his Report. 177
176. In the context of addressing the dangers of the Royal Charter, for
example, THE TELEGRAPH argued that “[t]he Guardian’s recent investigation
into state spying is exactly the kind of reporting that could spark a moral panic
among politicians and give them cause to limit what the press can publish.”
Telegraph View, The Fight Goes On For Press Freedom, THE TELEGRAPH, (Oct.
30, 2013), available at http://www.telegraph.co.uk/comment/telegraphview/10415103/The-fight-goes-on-forpress-freedom.html. On the divided UK
press, see, for example, Kenan Malik, Britain Needs a First Amendment, N.Y.
TIMES,
(Nov.
8,
2013),
available
at
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/11/09/opinion/malik-britain-needs-a-firstamendment.html.
Some proponents of press regulation “a la Leveson” argue that the
tabloids’ reactions to the Snowden reporting are a far bigger danger for press
freedom than self-regulation pursuant to Leveson and the Royal Charter. See,
e.g., Martin Moore, Part 2: The Topsy-Turvy World of Newspaper Regulation
and Government Spies, LSE MEDIA POLICY PROJECT BLOG, (Nov. 29, 2013),
available at http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/mediapolicyproject/2013/11/29/part-2-thetopsy-turvy-world-of-newspaper-regulation-and-government-spies/.
But this
point does not take a bird’s eye view of the situation. It may well be precisely
because of the Leveson Report, the Royal Charter, and pending exemplary
damages and costs under the Crimes and Courts Act 2013 that the tabloids
have turned their backs so overtly on the free speech implications of The
Guardian’s reporting on Snowden matters. See also supra note 106. Whatever
their intentions, these papers’ critique of The Guardian’s national security
coverage might be interpreted by government not only as an argument that
broadsheets are more harmful and dangerous than the tabloids criticized by
Leveson, but also as an offer of a subtle quid pro quo on press reform. Their
stance could reasonably be seen as an implicit assurance by public proclamation
that the press is to be trusted to be docile and amenable on matters important
to the state even if it has sometimes gone overboard in the individual privacy
context.
177. See supra note 115. Public outrage could be attributed to the revelation
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On this view, the Leveson Report unfairly highlighted the
press’ failures, rather than situating them in perspective, as
merely a part of a multi-institutional failure. 178 After all, the
institutional press today is part of a complex web of
organizations existing in a “complicated symbiosis with the
news media.” 179 The Leveson Report, although recognizing
the involvement of the police and politicians in the phonehacking affair, sought principally to repair the press piece of
the puzzle. 180 It also did not address the use of “dark arts” by
non-press private industry.
We should hesitate to solve interpenetrating, multiinstitutional
problems
by
regulating—or
at
least
disproportionately regulating—just one of the affected
institutions.
Each participant is compromised in such
situations. Singling out unethical action in only one of the
interacting institutions (press, politicians, and police) “while
keeping the broader agents of responsibility afloat . . . rais[es]
fundamental questions about which ethics matter and to
whom.” 181 Attempting to improve matters by placing the
that unethical behavior was more prevalent across institutions than had been
thought to be the case. On the press side, the revelations fueled arguments that
the tabloids had been unfairly targeted for behavior common elsewhere. Critics
also focused on the revelation that Justice Leveson had apparently been
apprised of such widespread phone-hacking in Britain but had chosen not even
to mention it in his report focusing on the press. Id.
178. See, e.g., Press Association, supra note 114 (quoting Daily Mail Editor
Paul Dacre: “I note with some irony that Leveson had barely a word of criticism
for the police and the politicians. Well, if the first had done their job properly
and the second had not so sycophantically fawned upon Murdoch, Leveson
would never have occurred.”).
179. Barbie Zelizer, When Practice Is Undercut By Ethics, ETHICS OF MEDIA
277 (Nick Couldry, Mirca Madianou & Amit Pinchevski eds. 2013).
180. The disclosure-focused recommendations proposed by Leveson for the
police and politicians appear to be far less directive and onerous than those for
the press.
181. Zelizer, supra note 179, at 278. Indeed, Professor Zelizer muses, “the
intimacy across institutions might merit as close attention as that being paid to
the interiors of the News of the World.” Id. For example, the apparent cover-up
of Serious Organised Crime Agency’s awareness of, and failure to act on, phonehacking by many other blue-chip British institutions practices seems to reveal
governmental misconduct. See, e.g., Helen Warrell & Cynthia O’Murchu, Soca
Failed To Act On ‘Blue-Chip Hacking’, FINANCIAL TIMES, (Aug. 21, 2013),
available
at
http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/8b40feb4-09bf-11e3-ad0700144feabdc0.html#axzz3HyF4V5WV; Tom Harper, ‘Bigger than phone hacking’
- Soca sat on blue-chip dirty tricks evidence for years, THE INDEPENDENT, (July
25, 2013), available at http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/crime/exclusivebigger-than-phone-hacking—soca-sat-on-bluechip-dirty-tricks-evidence-foryears-8730861.html. Under those circumstances, one might wonder whether
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principal burden on the press may ironically recalibrate the
balance of power among the participants and reduce the
press’ comparative institutional position as a whole, and
therefore further erode its ability to act as a watchdog over
other institutions. 182 This is particularly the case when,
whatever criminality and ethical excess were attributable to a
segment of the British press, there were certainly many
newspapers that did not participate.
selectivity in focusing on the unsavory newsgathering practices of journalists
would serve strategic interests in muzzling the press.
Moreover, one might question the appropriateness of targeting the press
rather than other participants in circumstances when multi-institutional
unethical behavior “relativize[s]” particular practices (such as paying for
information), or naturalizes practices (such as phone hacking) that might
otherwise have raised ethical qualms. See Zelizer, supra note 179, at 279. See
also Daniel Bennet & Judith Townend, Press ‘Omerta’: How Newspapers’
Failure to Report the Phone Hacking Scandal Exposed the Limitations of Media
Accountability at 149, ThE PHONE HACKING SCANDAL: JOURNALISM ON TRIAL,
BURY
ST
EDMUNDS:
ABRAMIS,
(Jan.
2012),
available
at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2000768
(describing
news organizations’ failure to report phone hacking scandal as due partly to the
“ cultural socialisation of a norm of behavior . . . that justified the use of the
‘dark arts’ as a way of holding power to account in the public interest. The
normalization of these practices within the press corps led to their diminishing
significance as an issue that might be deemed ‘unexpected’ and thus
‘newsworthy.’ ”). To the extent that enforcing criminal rules sends a signal as to
their social importance, it should primarily be the responsibility of the police to
send that signal. The absence of such a signal while the behavior becomes
increasingly common in the industry (or in business in general, as phone
hacking seems to have become in England) is tantamount to a counter-message.
182. One might wonder why that might be the case. To the contrary,
wouldn’t a press better guided by ethical principles improve in its ability to
ensure the accountability of other powerful institutions? If the phone-hacking
affair revealed a “one hand washes the other” symbiosis, then the press would
implicitly have conspired with the police and politicians to exchange favors.
Under those circumstances, isn’t it counter-intuitive to suggest that a selfregulatory regime would make the press less able to be the watchdog that it had
agreed not to be in the first place?
The first response to this is that not everyone in the British press
participated in the multi-institutional failures.
Yet regulation would
undermine their status as potential watchdogs as well. Moreover, the text
attempts to flag an issue of comparative power. Participants in multiinstitutional wrong-doing presumably negotiate their exchanges of benefits from
relatively equal, if dynamic, positions of power. At any point, each participant
is free to change the deal. If political wrongdoing were obvious enough, even a
compromised press would have incentives to reveal it. And if press illegality
were glaring enough, police and government would have to address it at some
point regardless of implicit quid pro quo arrangements. When one of the
participants submits to licensing by the other, however, that presumptive
equipoise in negotiating power no longer exists. And government has the upper
hand because the regulatory body can increase the difficulty of going after other
institutions’ abuses of power.
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D. Will Leveson’s Model Predictably Lead to Press SelfCensorship?
Lord Justice Leveson rejected concerns about the chilling
effect of his Report’s recommendations by saying: “I simply do
not accept that these provisions will have a chilling effect on
free speech or press freedom . . . I reject the suggestion that it
will cause a degeneration of the rights of the press or a
However, such robust
descent into state control.” 183
assertions are optimistic declarations that cannot negate the
multiple ways in which the Report’s suggestions could
foreseeably intimidate press coverage. 184
It would be reasonable for the press to fear regulation
because of the various incentives to regulate inherent in the
Royal Charter approach.
The press’ “voluntary” selfregulatory body would have a continuing desire to maintain
its Royal Charter certification and therefore face distinct
incentives to abide by the Recognition Body’s directly or
indirectly expressed preferences. It would operate in the
shadow of Lord Justice Leveson’s decimation of the PCC.
Stripped to its core, the Royal Charter model calls for the
creation of a regulator uncomfortably balancing values of
independence and professionalism, and under the continuing
oversight of a body in whose membership the press does not
even have any representation. Excessively press-restrictive
rules and increased litigation can be predicted as a result. A
former editor of The Guardian concludes that the Leveson
approach is “misguided” and will inevitably lead to a chilling
effect on reporting. 185 Indeed, he asserts that some of the
most significant investigative reporting of his Guardian
tenure might well have been deterred if a Leveson regulatory
regime had been in place. 186

183. LEVESON R EPORT , supra note 7, at vol. IV, pt. K, ch. 7, ¶ 7.8, 1782.
184. Indeed, even if the press industry’s proposed charter had been accepted,
British press reform would still pose challenges to freedom of the press. This is
because the phone-hacking scandal and attendant Leveson process created the
baselines against which press reform must be measured. Mere tinkering
around the edges would be insufficient in such an atmosphere.
185. See Peter Preston, Peter Preston: ‘Leveson Sees Journalism As An
Exercise In Providing Cases For The Courts To Examine’, PRESS GAZETTE, (Feb.
25,
2013),
available
at
http://www.pressgazette.co.uk/content/peterprestonleveson-sees-journalism-exercise-providing-cases-courts-examine.
186. Id.
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1. Structural Bias: Regulator Composition Requirements
The structure of the Recognition Panel established under
the Royal Charter precludes participation of publishers and
editors on the Board or staff, 187 and the Royal Charter’s
recognition criteria in turn require the majority of the board
of an acceptable press regulator to be independent of the
Although the Leveson Report reiterated its
press. 188
commitment to freedom of speech and press, the two levels of
required independence from the press predictably risk unduly
press-restrictive rules. Under this structure, the Recognition
Panel undervalues journalistic and editorial expertise. This in
turn is likely to influence the decisions of the recognized press
regulator. Whatever the journalists on the board of the
regulator would say, the final votes to be taken by the
regulator are likely to reflect the views of the non-press
majorities, and their predictions of what the pressindependent Recognition Panel would think of their
decisions. 189 Finally, the structure of the standards Code
Committee, by reducing the role of serving editors, is likely to
lead to a less press-protective code. 190
The rationale for the Leveson Report’s recommendation—
that the decision-making members of the body be
independent of the press—was that a non-press board would
represent a “balanced” view of press freedom and privacy.
However, the talismanic invocation of the notion of balance
here is not particularly helpful. How is such a majority-lay
body to balance those interests, which are often

187. Royal Charter on Self-Regulation of the Press, supra note 60, at 5.2, 7.3
& sched. 1. That politicians are also precluded from Board membership does
not minimize the negative effect of the press exclusion. That the Charter
requires every Board member to have “an understanding of the context within
which the Regulator will operate” (id. at 3.2(a)(ii)(emphasis supplied)) is a
requirement more anodyne than meaningful. Moreover, since Board members
can be terminated simply if “the Board is satisfied . . . that a Member is
unwilling, unable or unfit to discharge” his/her functions (id. at 6.2), there is
ample opportunity for a Board suspicious of the press to censure dissent and
ensure lock-step.
188. Royal Charter on Self-Regulation of the Press, supra note 60, at sched.
3, 3–5.
189. Indeed, the Report’s proposals might unintentionally cede control not
just to the self-regulatory body, but also to press targets themselves. With
control tipping toward privacy, news subjects could evade journalistic attention
simply by advising the press that they did not wish to be covered.
190. Royal Charter on Self-Regulation of the Press, supra note 60, sched. 3,
at 7, 8.
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incommensurable? Moreover, if the body were effective,
would the public interest really benefit from the
transformation of a cacophony of voices into the milquetoast
of neutral and balanced homogeneity?
The problem is particularly acute with respect to the
reporting aspect of the Leveson recommendations, as opposed
to its newsgathering proposals. Even if the self-regulatory
organization as structured by Leveson could reach consensus
with regard to the inappropriate use of surreptitious
newsgathering techniques (especially in the infotainment
context of tabloid coverage), second-guessing editorial and
publication decisions is more problematic. The Leveson
Report itself un-self-consciously adopts a judicial stance,
rejecting publication decisions as to which reasonable minds
could disagree. Its suggestion that the press claiming a
public interest defense should make available the details of
its weighing of interests is unrealistic in light of the time
pressures of reporting today, and constitutes an invitation to
Monday morning quarter-backing.
Many publication decisions have to be made quickly, on
the basis of inadequate information, without a clear
understanding of their possible impacts, on the basis of an
assessment of their apparent importance at that moment.
Editors could differ among themselves as to publication
choices, and the same editors could even make different
choices on another day. While the Leveson recommendation
of internal governance and compliance systems might be
helpful in journalistic self-assessments on this score,
legalistic external review is likely to have a chilling effect far
beyond the precincts of the tabloid newsrooms which are the
true targets of the Leveson Report. 191
191. The Ed Miliband controversy is a useful lens through which to look at
this question. The Daily Mail published an article impugning the loyalty to
Britain of Marxist theorist Ralph Miliband, opposition leader Ed Miliband’s
deceased father. See, e.g., Jamie Doward & Toby Helm, How The Mail
Blundered Into A Vicious Battle With Labour, THE GUARDIAN, (Oct. 5, 2013),
available at http://www.theguardian.com/media/2013/oct/05/daily-mail-battlelabour-lord-rothermere. It is undisputed that the Daily Mail, under editor Paul
Dacre, is an opinionated Conservative voice with a strong anti-socialist stance
and a penchant for shrill and attention-grabbing headlines. Although many
Britons seem to agree that the paper’s headline accusing Ralph Miliband of
“hating” Britain on the basis of a snippet of teenage writing was inaccurate and
would warrant an apology from the paper, there is true disagreement both as to
the meanings/claims of the story and as to its newsworthiness. On one
narrative, it is important for the public to know the political views of the
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2. Cyclical Review and Systemic Ad Hoc Review Power
The Board of the Recognition Panel must review the
recognition of a regulator according to a cyclical schedule
It may also review the
established in the Charter. 192
recognition of a regulator under “exceptional circumstances”
in the public interest. 193 Finally, it can withdraw recognition
not only when the regulator is not meeting the Recognition
Criteria, but even when the Recognition Panel has
“insufficient information to determine” whether it is doing
so. 194
The speech-deterring effect of this Scheme of Recognition
is obvious on its face. Exceptional circumstances are not
defined in the Charter. The Report is not clear about how to
define systemic misbehavior despite the new press regulator’s

outspoken father of a politician possibly in line to be Prime Minister because
they may raise questions about the politician’s own commitments. On the
contrary narrative, the Mail’s story was little more than a trumped-up political
hatchet job using irrelevant and over-interpreted information about his parent
in order to undermine a rising politician from the paper’s competitor party. On
yet another set of contending narratives, the Mail either engaged in an
outrageous personal insult, or chose to report on a sensitive personal topic in
pursuit of the public interest. To one degree or another, any or all of those
explanations may be “true”—although most would agree that Dacre suffered a
lapse of judgment (and the headline overstated the story). See Roy Greenslade,
Ed Miliband’s Challenge To Daily Mail Exposes Editor Paul Dacre As A Bully,
THE
GUARDIAN,
(Oct.
2,
2013),
available
at
http://www.theguardian.com/media/greenslade/2013/oct/02/edmilibandpauldacre (arguing that even though the issue of Ralph Miliband’s views was a
legitimate topic for the paper, its headline conclusion was “over the top” and
made the paper a bully). But because the “truth” of the story can be assayed at
different levels and with different results, this argument cannot be dismissed
simply as an analogy to the false equivalence of “he said-she said” journalism
decried by journalism theorists. See, e.g., Jay Rosen, He Said, She Said
Journalism: Lame Formula in the Land of the Active User, PRESSTHINK, (Apr.
12,
2013),
available
at
http://pressthink.org/2009/04/he-said-she-saidjournalism-lame-formula-in-the-land-of-the-active-user/. Which of the various
narratives offered above (and there are of course others as well) is objectively
“true” is not a question that should be decided by a government-backed private
regulator. It should be noted that the paper printed Ed Miliband’s response to
its article in its entirety. (The Mail was hoisted on its own petard—Dacre’s
mistake ironically re-invigorated the press regulation movement). In any event,
when Mr. Miliband himself escalated the story to be not about a bad call on a
particular editorial decision, but an example of a problematic journalistic
culture—harking back to the language of the Leveson Inquiry—he ironically
demonstrated the problem inherent in Leveson’s regulatory hybrid.
192. Royal Charter on Self-Regulation of the Press, supra note 60, at sched.
2, 5–6.
193. Id. at sched. 2, 8–9.
194. Id. at sched. 2, 11.

2015]

TAMING THE “FERAL BEAST”

369

ability to impose very significant fines for systemic
misbehavior or failure to comply with its rulings. 195 The PCC
is faulted for not having seen that phone-hacking had become
a systemic press activity and for having believed the
representations of the News of the World staff that phonehacking there had been limited to one rogue reporter. How
will the new press regulator make sure not to fall into the
same trap? Will every complaint potentially be seen as
evidence of systemic malfunction? 196 Will history impel the
Recognition Panel and the regulator to intrude into editorial
decisions with roving consistency simply to ensure that any
given complaint does not present a systemic problem?
A fundamental difficulty with the inquisitorial power
over systemic problems is that, structurally, the Recognition
Body faces significant incentives to regulate. In addition to
the oft-noted institutional incentives of regulators to regulate,
the press regulatory bodies face the additional pressures of
transparency requirements 197 that place their activities under
the microscope of groups with regulatory agendas. Knowing
that the Charter’s transparency requirements would open its
decision-making to public oversight and challenge by interest
groups such as Hacked Off, both the Recognition Body and
the press self-regulator operate under distinct incentives to
appear effective by engaging in broad-scale investigation.
3. Third Party Complaints
By retaining the cost-free character of the PCC complaint
review process, but by permitting third party complaints to be
brought against press coverage, the Leveson Report opens the
floodgates to complaints about press coverage. It also invites
politicization of press regulation—responding to the
ideological commitments of complaining interest groups.
Moreover, by inviting advocacy groups to bring claims about
what it characterizes as “discriminatory” news coverage to

195. The possible chilling effect of million pound fines imposed on those
newspapers that are deemed by the self-regulatory body to have failed to comply
with the body’s requirements is self-evident. Royal Charter, supra note 60,
sched. 3.
196. The recognition body is also granted significant investigatory leeway
and power to command the production of documents and information in its
convenience under the proposed Royal Charter. See generally Royal Charter,
supra note 60, sched. 2.
197. Royal Charter, supra note 60, at 13.1 & sched. 3.
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the press regulator, the Report transforms the press regulator
into a super-editor, deeply embedded in the fundamental
editorial decisions about what gets covered and how. It is
highly likely that opinionated, partisan papers will cover
news in ways that various advocacy and affinity groups would
see as discriminatory, insufficient, insensitive, and
inaccurate. If questions of truth and accuracy—which are
sufficiently difficult to ascertain with respect to isolated facts
and events—are to be freely brought with respect to a paper’s
entire coverage, style, and editorial stance, then the press
regulator will have succeeded in becoming a private censor of
the newspaper industry, protected under the rubric of public
power. 198
4. Pre-Publication Review
The “offer” of pre-publication review by the regulator
further exacerbates concerns about chill. 199 Although the
proposal recommends that such a review service be entirely
voluntary, there is a non-trivial danger that it could become a
factor in later litigation in assessing the newspaper’s

198. The Leveson Report noted that the Inquiry had received evidence from
public interest groups indicating that the need to have a victim come forward
made “generic” kinds of complaints about inaccurate press coverage effectively
“unchallengeable.” LEVESON REPORT, supra note 7, vol. I, pt. A, ch. 2, at 22.
That seems to overstate the problem, at least in many cases.
The authority to direct the placement of retractions, corrections and
apologies has also been criticized as leading to chilling effects. See, e.g., Right
Hon. Peter Lilley MP, Royal Charter on Press Conduct, RT HON PETER LILLEY
MP,
(Mar.
18,
2013),
available
at
http://www.peterlilley.co.uk/parliamentaryspeeches/1729/royal-charter-pressconduct (criticizing charter’s provisions as creating a “mini, self-appointed
Ministry of Truth.”); Index on Censorship, Leveson, The Royal Charter, And
Press Pegulation, INDEX ON CENSORSHIP, (Apr. 11, 2013), available at
http://www.indexoncensorship.org/2013/04/index-on-censorship-leveson-royalcharter-and-press-regulation/ (the power to direct the wording and placement of
apologies and corrections opposed as an “effective transfer of editorial control
[representing] a level of external interference with editorial procedures that
would undermine editorial independence and undermine press freedom.”). Cf.
Article 19, UK: Draft Royal Charter on Self-Regulation of the Press, ARTICLE 19,
(Apr.
2,
2013),
available
at
http://www.article19.org/resources.php/resource/3687/en/uk:-draft-royal-charteron-self-regulation-of-the-press (recommending a narrowed scope for the press
regulator’s ability to direct the nature, extent and placement of corrections and
apologies).
199. More indirectly, so does the Charter’s directive that the Recognition
Panel “publish policies, guidance and information . . . .” Royal Charter on SelfRegulation of the Press, supra note 60, at sched. 2, 13.
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behavior. 200
If a newspaper either did not seek prepublication clearance or decided to act contrary to the advice
given, negative inferences could be drawn, thereby making
the voluntary advisory service an affirmative requirement
“through the back door.” 201 Is it not predictable that refusals
to take advantage of such an offer could be interpreted as
reckless? If so, then the editorial function would have been
outsourced to a non-journalist body likely to be skeptical of
press decisions in perhaps the most difficult cases.
Pre-publication review also brings into sharp relief the
potential conflicts in the complex regulatory scheme under
Leveson. The self-regulatory body is assigned a multiplicity
of tasks and roles under the proposed regulatory system. It
would not be irrational for newspapers to fear that if they did
not comply with pre-publication review recommendations,
arbitral consequences against them could foreseeably
ensue. 202
5. Exemplary Damages and Costs
The exemplary damages 203 and costs aspects of the
200. The Royal Charter does not make this Leveson Report recommendation
mandatory and states that a failure to comply with this specific
recommendation (among a few others) will not lead the regulator to lose its
Royal Charter accreditation. Charter on Self-Regulation of the Press, supra
note 60, at sched. 2, no. 4. Nevertheless, it permits the Board of the Recognition
Panel to take the availability of pre-publication review into account. Id. See
also id. at sched. 3, no. 17. Such a service can all-too-easily be transformed into
a behavioral expectation non-compliance with which could be considered
culpable by courts or arbitrators in press complaint cases.
201. David Hooper & Brid Jordan, Phone Hacking and the Press: The Leveson
Report, at 43.
202. The newspaper industry also objects to the forced apologies and
retractions contemplated by the Royal Charter system. See, e.g., WAN-IFRA,
PRESS FREEDOM, supra note 4, at 15. The potentially chilling effect of such
remedies is obvious and need not require further elaboration here.
203. Although it is unlikely that British press regulation would be rejected
vel non under the European Convention on Human Rights, some have argued
that a narrower ground for appeal might be the exemplary damages provision in
the Court and Crimes Act. If, for example, a court in a media tort action were to
impose exemplary damages on a newspaper that had not joined a certified selfregulatory body, the paper arguably could claim a violation of Article 10 of the
Convention.
It is beyond the scope of this Article to discuss the contending views on
whether liability for exemplary damages would be unlawful under Article 10 of
the European Convention on Human Rights. See Potter, supra note 76
(referring to contending legal opinions on the subject). It should be noted,
however, that the British newspapers are reportedly planning an appeal to the
European Court of Human Rights in the event that they are subject to
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exemplary damages in media tort actions simply because they have not
subscribed to a self-regulatory body recognized under the Royal Charter. Lisa
O’Carroll, Papers Plan European Legal Action If They Are Penalised For
Regulation Stance, THE GUARDIAN, (Oct. 10, 2013), available at
http://www.theguardian.com/media/2013/oct/10/newspapers-appeal-europepress-regulation (quoting a press industry source as saying “[y]ou have to go to
Europe as the consequences are so bad in terms of costs and exemplary
damages that you can’t just sit there and take them.”).
Of course, the papers would first have to exhaust local remedies—the
U.K. courts—before they could appeal to the European Court of Human Rights.
See ANDREW NICOL, GAVIN MILLAR & ANDREW SHARLAND, MEDIA LAW AND
HUMAN RIGHTS 75 (2d ed. 2009). In any event, it should be noted that the
prospect is distant in time because a number of time-consuming steps need to be
taken before such a test could arise–including the full establishment of the
recognition body under the Royal Charter, a lawsuit lost by the press, and the
judicial imposition of exemplary damages on the newspaper seeking to appeal
on Convention grounds.
Interestingly, recent reports indicate that the culture and media
department of the UK government has rejected the Telegraph’s freedom of
information request to disclose “ a paper which ‘is thought’ to set out advice on
whether the government-sponsored royal charter breaches European law.” Roy
Greenslade, Government Refuses To Disclose Legal Opinion On Press
Regulation,
THE
GUARDIAN,
(Jan.
15,
2014),
http://www.theguardian.com/media/greenslade/2014/jan/19/press-regulationfreedomofinformation.
A legal opinion previously commissioned by the
newspaper publishers apparently concluded that the exemplary damages
provisions were incompatible with the ECHR. Id. The Department of Culture
and Media argued that “premature disclosure” of the legal advice “might close
off better options” for ministers and officials. Id. A government spokesman
apparently stated that legal advice was not routinely disclosed by the
government and that “[w]e are clear that independent self-regulation of the
press is entirely consistent with the European convention on human rights
[sic].” Id. This is far from a full and transparent answer to a question on such a
fundamental issue.
Contending views have been expressed on the issue, although none have
been made public in detail. In its terms, Article 10 is a qualified right that,
under the Convention, must be balanced against other rights. It is said that
“context is all-important” in deciding the lawfulness of a restriction on
expressive freedom under Article 10. Article 8, which protects the right to
privacy, is one of the contending obligations in the Convention. The European
Court of Human Rights has noted the need to balance the Article 10 right to
free expression and the Article 8 right to reputation. See, e.g., Cumpana and
Mazare
v.
Romania,
(2005)
41
EHRR4
(GC),
available
at
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-67816)[113] (“[T]he
Contracting States are permitted, or even obliged, by their positive obligations
under Article 8 of the Convention . . . [t]o regulate the exercise of freedom of
expression so as to ensure adequate protection by law of individuals’
reputations, they must not do so in a manner that unduly deters the media from
fulfilling their role of alerting the public to a parent or suspected misuse of
public power.”). Where a regulation invokes a conflict between Convention
provisions, courts must bring “intense focus” to the analysis of the comparative
importance of the claimed rights in the individual case. HUMAN RIGHTS
REVIEW, supra note 203, at 349 (quoting In Re S (A Child), IDENTIFICATION:
RESTRICTIONS ON PUBLICATION (2005) 1 AC 593, ¶ 17, per Lord Steyn). The
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Article 8 and Article 10 balance has also taken into account the public stature of
the individual in question, the degree of interference with privacy, and any
breach of law or professional ethics by the reporters. Article 10: Freedom of
Expression, HUMAN RIGHTS REVIEW supra, 349–50 (2012).
Moreover, under Article 10(2) itself, restrictions on expression are
permitted if they are “necessary in a democratic society” “for the protection of
the reputation or rights of others.” To the extent that the Leveson approach is
seen as nothing more than accountable self–regulation of the press in a manner
analogous to the laws of other Convention member states, a win for the
newspapers is far from inevitable. Article 10 is set to protect political and
public interest speech more than reporting on matters of “largely prurient
interest.” HUMAN RIGHTS REVIEW at 349. Moreover, a recent report asserts
that the European Court of Human Rights “has in recent years paid increasing
attention to the extent to which journalists have complied with professional
ethics in determining the parameters of article 10, particularly in cases in
which serious issues of reputation and/or privacy are at stake.” Id. at 349.
Analysts have addressed the question of whether compulsory regulation
of the print media would be compatible with Article 10 ECHR. See Hugh
Tomlinson, Is Compulsory Regulation Of The Print Media Compatible With
Article 10 ECHR?, UK HUMAN RIGHTS BLOG, (Aug. 22, 2012), available at
http://ukhumanrightsblog.com/2012/08/22/is-compulsory-regulation-of-the-printmedia-compatible-with-article-10-echr-hugh-tomlinson-qc/. Tomlinson concludes
that “the answer may not be as entirely straightforward.” The Court has never
addressed the issue of “self-regulation” versus state regulation from the point of
view of Article 10. Id. Tomlinson’s analysis: “The basic position seems clear.
First, a system of compulsory media regulation is a prima facie interference
with the right to freedom of expression and must, therefore, be justified under
Article 10(2). Second, such a system would, if enacted by statute, plainly be in
accordance with law and would serve a legitimate aim (for example, the
protection of the rights of others). As a result, third, the crucial question would,
therefore, be whether the system was “necessary in a democratic society”—
whether it was proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued.” Id. Tomlinson
also notes that international human rights case law finds compulsory
registration of journalists to be an unjustified interference with the right to
freedom of expression. In his reading of the cases, “the international human
rights jurisprudence makes it clear that any requirement which made the
practice of journalism dependent on statutory licensing would be a violation of
the right to freedom of expression.” Id. Yet compulsory regulation of large
publishers is not necessarily the same thing as licensing journalists. Id. It has
also been established that broadcast media regulation is not problematic under
Article 10, so long as it is necessary and proportionate, and therefore
compulsory regulation of the print media would not necessarily be problematic
as such, according to Tomlinson.
Despite all that, however, it is possible that under precedents like the
Naomi Campbell decision, the European Court of Human Rights might find that
the cost and exemplary damages provision of the Court and Crimes Act 2013
should be considered disproportionate and therefore violative of Article 10 in
principle. The European Court has in the past found British press decisions to
violate Article 10. See Article 10: Freedom of expression, HUMAN RIGHTS
REVIEW, 330, 339–40 (2012) (citing to Goodwin v. UK, 22 Eur. Ct. H.R. 123
(1996), in which the European Court of Human Rights ruled that a House of
Lords decision requiring a journalists to disclose the identity of a source
breached the journalist’s Article 10 rights, and the national media being
granted access to private hearings before the Court of Protection). And, in 2011,
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carrot-and-stick inducement mechanisms recommended in
the Leveson Report also pose a financial threat to the press,
particularly to smaller and less commercially established
entities. 204 Exemplary damages could be extraordinarily
expensive. As for costs, publishers not members of an
approved regulator and therefore not participating in
arbitration might have to pay the plaintiff’s potentially
expansive costs in media tort suits even if the publishers were
substantively vindicated—again raising the likelihood of chill.
Moreover, for any news organization, the decision whether to
join the regulatory system will depend on comparing the costs
of participation with the possibility of exemplary damages or
no cost reimbursement. Publishers who choose to forego
joining a regulator are also “more likely to self-censor in order
to minimise their exposure to the risk of being sued, even if
they believe that it would be lawful to publish.” 205 Despite
attempts to ensure clarity of coverage, the structure of the
proposed regime reflects uncertainty as to both those factors.
The vagueness of the defined category is likely to pose a
problem for a broad range of intermediate entities. 206
the European Court held that the 100% success fee that the court required the
defendant to pay in a breach of confidence action, Naomi Campbell v. MGM,
was out of proportion to the extent of damages awarded to the plaintiff, was
disproportionate, and violated Article 10. HUMAN RIGHTS REVIEW, supra, at
362.
Ultimately, each inquiry under Article 10 is “fact specific,” requiring
judicial analysis of the precise features of the regulatory scheme at issue.
Tomlinson, supra. “The nature of the regulator and the code which it applied
would be relevant factors in the proportionality exercise, as would be the extent
of the application of the compulsory regime. The Court would also take into
account the “mischief” that the regulatory system was intended to deal with.
Id. According to one analyst addressing a compulsory approach prior to the
issuance of the co-regulatory Leveson report, “[a] system of compulsory
regulation for large publishers recommended by the Leveson inquiry would be
designed to deal with the ‘mischief’ of wholesale invasion of rights identified by
the Inquiry. If the regulator was independent of all government influence and
applied a Code drawn up with substantial import from the media and
journalists these would all be factors which the Court would take into account
in the ‘justification exercise.’ ” Id. See also Anthony Lester, Two Cheers for the
First Amendment, 8 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 177, 191 (2014) (contending that the
system’s punitive sanctions are unlikely to pass muster in the ECtHR).
204. Although small entities have the most to fear, it should not be forgotten
that the entire newspaper sector has been struggling financially world-wide, to
greater and lesser degrees.
205. Anthony, supra note 113, at 5.
206. Bloggers have noted this concern. See, e.g., Cory Doctorow, Act Now To
Stop The UK Leveson Press-Regulations From Applying To Blogs And
Individuals Online!, BOINGBOING, (Mar. 22, 2013), available at
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Depending on the specific costs of joining the new system, an
online news provider could face a financially onerous choice
either way.
6. Arbitration
As for arbitration, a free arbitral process for all media
disputes—especially when joined with a recent possible
government proposal for “cost protection” in defamation and
privacy claims to protect those of “modest means” 207—could
induce the filing of many five- or six-figure damage claims
over privacy complaints or inaccuracies against the quality
press (not to mention the tabloids). 208 This has been a
http://boingboing.net/2013/03/22/act-now-to-stop-the-uk-leveson.html;
Cory
Doctorow, UK Press-Regulation Defines “Press” So Broadly As To Include
Tweeters, Facebook Users, Bloggers, BOINGBOING, (Mar. 18, 2013), available at
http://boingboing.net/2013/03/18/uk-press-regulation-defines.html;
Cory
Doctorow, More On The Impact Of UK Press Regulation On Blogs, Websites,
Tweeters, And Social Media, BOINGBOING, (Mar. 19, 2013), available at
http://boingboing.net/2013/03/19/more-on-the-impact-of-uk-press.html. See also
infra notes 212–14.
207. The British government issued a consultation paper on such a cost
protection proposal. See Ministry of Justice, Costs Protection in Defamation and
Privacy Claims: The Government’s Proposals, (Nov. 8, 2013), available at
https://consult.justice.gov.uk/digital-communications/costs-protection-indefamation-and-privacyclaims/supporting_documents/Costsprotectionindefamationandprivacyclaimscon
sultationpaper.pdf.
208. Admittedly, having identified this issue, the Leveson Report
recommended that any free arbitral process include “a system to allow frivolous
or vexatious claims to be struck out at an early stage.” LEVESON REPORT ,
supra note 7, at 1769. This is not a sufficient safeguard, however.
Recent suggestions designed to achieve that goal make the problems
self-evident. Some suggest that such a system could be adopted without conflict
with Article 6 of the European Convention of Human Rights, and could include,
for example, “a mandatory, 28-day ‘fast track’ adjudication process . . . [akin to
one introduced for the construction industry in 1996].” Sir Charles Gray &
Alastair Brett, Press Regulation: Speedy Adjudication Could Help Break
Leveson Impasse, THE GUARDIAN, (Sept. 29, 2013), available at
http://www.theguardian.com/media/2013/sep/29/press-regulation-fast-trackadjudication. Whatever the ease with which construction disputes can be
resolved on a fast-track basis, it might be questioned whether Gray and Brett’s
proposal for an independent arbitrator would in fact “enable[] most [press]
actions to be settled within days.” Id. Identified “key issues” such as “the
meaning of the words complained of, or if they are an honest comment or
statement of fact or in the public interest,” are not often likely to be susceptible
of such quick and easy resolution. Id. Moreover, to the extent that this
proposal would have the new press regulator use “a small group of experienced
independent lawyers to filter claims”—even as to whether they would go
forward to the twenty-eight-day fast track adjudication—the choke-point
problem would be rendered even more acute. See id.
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particular concern for the financially strapped regional press
in Britain. 209 There are also questions whether the structure
of the compulsory arbitration approach would sufficiently
protect expressive press values.
7. Uncertainty and Incoherence as to Scope of Coverage
One of the major problems facing the proposed press
regulation scheme is its scope of coverage. It clearly covers
the traditional print newspaper, but what other entities are
likely to be swept into the regulatory net?
The Leveson Report makes unpersuasive distinctions
between the print press and online journalism. 210 Leveson
recognizes that the organization might not be appropriate for
small blogs. 211 In keeping with that intuition, both the
Crimes and Courts Act 2013 legislation—permitting
exemplary damages—and the Royal Charter for the
Recognition Panel attempt to limit the systems’ coverage to
more established entities. The post-Leveson attempt to
define the scope of the Royal Charter’s coverage vis-à-vis
Internet news organizations does not solve the problem of the
scope of coverage, however.
Thus, for example, the current legislation in the Crimes
and Courts Act 2013 contemplates application of the cost
209. The regional and local newspapers—whose processes were generally
approved by the Leveson Report—have strongly argued against Leveson’s
proposed arbitral arm for this reason. See, e.g., Lisa O’Carroll, Nick Clegg
Urged To Consult Local Papers Over Press Regulation Royal Charter, THE
GUARDIAN,
(Apr.
18,
2013),
available
at
http://www.theguardian.com/media/2013/apr/18/press-regulation-royal-charternick-clgg; LEVESON REPORT, supra note 7 (clearing the regional and local
newspaper press of the culture of illegality for which he criticized elements of
the national press). It is not clear that the concession in the new Royal Charter
allowing regional papers showing serious harm to opt out of arbitration is
sufficient to eliminate the papers’ concerns. The statute nowhere explains
either the burden of proof or what is to count as a showing of “serious” financial
hardship.
210. Editorial, Fleet Street’s Grim Reaper, THE ECONOMIST, Dec. 1, 2012
(noting that the Leveson Report showed little interest in the media industry’s
future, and concluding that it “already seems dated.”). The Economist asks:
“Should an offensive blog post be treated in the same way as an offensive article
on a newspaper website? How about a comment—or a tweet? Does it still make
sense to regulate the press, as opposed to all public writing? The lawyers and
politicians grappling with these questions got little guidance from Lord Justice
Leveson . . . .” Id. Cf. Adam Cohen, The Media That Need Citizens: The First
Amendment and The Fifth Estate, 85 S. CAL. L. REV. 1, 4 (2011) (“As journalism
moves forward, media law and policy are looking backward.”).
211. LEVESON REPORT, supra note 7, vol. IV, pt. K, ch. 7, ¶ 6.35, at 1779.
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incentive scheme to “relevant publishers”—including, but not
limited to, newspaper publishers. 212 Under the Act, a news
purveyor would have to satisfy four cumulative criteria in
order to be deemed a “relevant publisher”: that it publish
“news-related material,” “in the course of a business” whether
or not for profit, producing material “written by different
authors,” and “subject to editorial control” over content,
presentation, and publication decision. 213 In turn, “newsrelated material” is defined very broadly, including news or
information about current affairs, opinion about matters
relating to the news or current affairs, gossip about
celebrities or public figures in the news.
The statute
specifically excludes broadcasters, “special interest titles,”
scientific or academic journals, public bodies and charities,
company news publications, book publishers, and microbusiness blogs (with multiple authors, fewer than ten
employees and an annual turnover of no more than £ 2
million). 214
In addition to specifically excluded entities, discussion in
the House of Commons indicated that the “relevant
publisher” category was intended to catch “more sophisticated
news publishers” and not “small-scale activity online.”215
Then-Culture Secretary Miller specified news aggregation
services such as Yahoo and Google, social networking sites,
and sites which moderate others’ comments or aggregate
blogs “without any active consideration of the content” as
excluded services. 216 Yet a recent report by English PEN
concludes that categories of publishers “that the government
itself intended to be exempt” will be expected to join the
regulator, and that charities, not-for-profit community
newspapers, political parties, some specialist publications will
also be swept into the definition of relevant publishers. 217
Moreover, otherwise similarly-situated web sites will be
212. Crimes and Courts Act 2013, ch. 22, §§ 34, 35. The Royal Charter, in
sched. 4, specifically incorporates the definition of “relevant publisher” under
the Crimes and Courts Act 2013, § 41.
For a recent critique of the
indeterminacy of the “relevant publishers” category, see generally Anthony,
supra note 113.
213. Crimes and Courts Act 2013, ch. 22, § 41. See also Potter, supra note
76.
214. Crime and Courts Act 2013, sched. 15.
215. Potter, supra note 76 (quoting then-Culture Secretary Maria Miller).
216. Id.
217. Anthony, supra note 113, at 3, 5, 7, 9–14.
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classed differently. For example, because they are operated
by broadcasters, the websites of BBC and Sky News will not
be characterized as “relevant publishers,” while those of The
Guardian and The Times will be. 218
Despite attempts to carve up the universe of news
purveyors in the legislation itself, there is a significant risk
that many small publishers will either be swept into the new
regulatory regime because they do not fit exactly into the
scheduled exemptions, or believe that they are, therefore
leading them to feel compelled to join the regulatory
regime. 219 This is also because the list of covered publishers
includes everyone, with a few exemptions, rather than the
other way around. Moreover, such a piecemeal list of
exempted publishers reads like a laundry list of publishers
who succeeded in arguing their way out of the definition as
part of political compromise rather than a list generated by a
clear, thought-out, policy analysis. One can imagine any
number of disseminators of news-related material who would
reasonably entertain questions about their status under this
system. 220
In addition, the distinctions in coverage are difficult to
square. For example, many local newspapers might satisfy
What
the exclusion threshold for micro-businesses. 221
principle, though, justifies their exclusion vis-à-vis larger
newspapers? Is the distinction designed as a proxy for
influence? If so, does size necessarily matter? Do individuals
with extensive followings on Twitter and Facebook
necessarily have less influence in the news ecosystem than
mid-size regional newspapers? And if websites run by
newspaper organizations would be subject to Royal Charter
provisions while those run by Internet companies (such as
Google) or broadcasters would not be covered, 222 then such a
result both undermines the effectiveness of the system and
raises questions about the underlying rationale for the

218. Id. at 15.
219. See, e.g., id. at 9–12.
220. Commentators have mentioned the status of news agencies such as the
Press Association, independent organizations such as the Bureau of
Investigative Journalism, and student newspapers.
221. Micro-businesses are defined as having fewer than ten employees and a
turnover of less than £2,000,000. See Crime & Courts Act 2013, sched. 15, §
8(4); Anthony supra note 113, at 14.
222. WAN-IFRA, PRESS FREEDOM, supra note 4 at 15.
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definitional approach. If the reason for excluding small
Internet publications is that their reporting will not likely
have the same impact as the tabloids, then query whether
that is still the case or, in any event, will continue to be the
case in the future? And why interfere in the evolution of the
news ecosystem if such interference will not ensure privacy
for subjects of press attention? Similarly, why exclude small,
multi-author blogs while refusing to protect community-based
online papers, or some powerful blogs because they fit into
the micro-business category, while including as relevant
publishers blogs that are in fact less influential but operated
with more employees and a bigger purse? 223
In a thorough recent analysis of the “relevant publisher”
category under the Crimes and Courts Act, English PEN
concluded that “there is a worrying lack of clarity regarding
the classification of relevant publisher[]” 224 and that the
current regime “will create uncertainty and chill freedom of
expression.” 225 As a result, English PEN “calls for an urgent
review of the legislation.” 226
8. The Third Leg of the Stool: Changed Legal Rules
Affecting Newsgathering
When one takes a bird’s eye view, the British press is at
risk of constraint from a multi-pronged control strategy—
from the combination of the self-regulatory process,
government pressure justified by national security, and a
rollback of access to information for reporting. The Report’s
recommendations for legal changes beyond civil law
recognition of exemplary damages thus also raise the
possibility of press intimidation. 227

223. Anthony, supra note 113, at 15.
224. Id. at 5.
225. Id. at 3.
226. Id.
227. Although a detailed assessment of these changes is beyond the scope of
this Article, it can be said that some of the recommendations regarding data
protection and reforms of journalistic protections in the Police and Criminal
Evidence Act (PACE) are likely to stymie newsgathering. See Alex Bailin,
Leveson: Police And The Media, The Proposals, INFORRM’S BLOG, (Dec. 3, 2012),
available at http://inforrm.wordpress.com/2012/12/03/leveson-police-and-themedia-the-proposals-alex-bailin-qc/ (discussing the implications of Leveson’s
proposals for legal changes); Gillian Phillips, Media Law After Leveson: A View
From The Coalface, POLICY BRIEF, THE FOUNDATION FOR LAW, JUSTICE AND
SOC’Y (Apr. 2013).

380

SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW

[Vol: 55

E. Will Regulatory Benefits Likely Outweigh the Risks of
Chill?
Lord Justice Leveson’s rather sanguine conclusions
denying chill implicitly rest on a press trade-off: a belief that
a certain amount of press deterrence is acceptable if other
important values are served thereby—so long as it does not
result from formal and direct state control. At least one
question is whether such values are in fact likely to be served
by press regulation.
The answer to this question is “no.” At a minimum, the
risk of chill should caution against regulation: (1) when
regulation is unlikely to achieve its principal asserted goals,
and (2) when attempts to cabin the chilling impact are not
likely to be reliable. This is particularly the case at times
when government actions worldwide require a courageous
press to be unafraid to hold the government accountable.
1. Ineffectiveness in Protecting Privacy
The starting point for the Leveson balancing approach is
a sense that self-regulatory obligations placed on the press
constitute a worthwhile exchange for the protection of other
public values such as privacy. The legitimacy of imposing
such commitments on the press would diminish if they could
not realistically ensure protection of the counter-weighing
values. But the Leveson Report does not assess the likely
effectiveness of its model on the privacy side of the balance it
advances. Simply put, it does not answer the question
whether muzzling the U.K. press would in fact sufficiently
protect press victims’ privacy and dignitary interests in
practice.
The United Kingdom does not protect privacy, as such, in
its common law. So why should it protect privacy directly
only against the class of press defendants?
Moreover,
newspaper publishers have argued that it makes little sense
to constrain the publication choices of British media when the
very material at issue is globally available via the Internet. 228
228. For example, one might wonder whether prohibitions on British tabloid
publication of nude pictures of Prince Harry actually succeeded in protecting
the royals’ privacy and dignity when the photos were instantaneously available
on the Internet elsewhere to curious audiences doubtless including British
citizens. See LEVESON REPORT, supra note 7, pt. C, 3.7, at 165 (mentioning this
argument). See also Louise Eccles, Rebecca English & Alan Hall, Royal privacy
row as German tabloid publishes picture of the Duchess of Cambridge’s bare
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The reality of instantaneous worldwide dissemination of
private information enabled by the Internet is that territorial
prohibitions on the press are unlikely realistically to protect
the privacy interests of the subjects of media attention. 229 In
other words, effectiveness at press censorship will not
necessarily lead to effectiveness in protecting press victims.
Can we really conclude that press regulation will be effective
and credible if it will impose asymmetric costs on one part of
the Fourth Estate without assuring corresponding benefits
with respect to other aspects of the public interest? 230
behind when her skirt blew up during Australia tour, MAIL ONLINE, (May 27,
2014), available at http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2639702/Royalprivacy-row-German-tabloid-website-publishes-picture-Duchess-Cambridgesskirt-blew-Australia-tour.html (describing German tabloid’s publication of
derriere-revealing Duchess of Cambridge pictures).
229. A key goal articulated by the Leveson Report is that its proposed
solutions “be perceived as effective and credible both by the press as an industry
and by the public.” LEVESON REPORT, supra note 7, vol. IV, pt. K, ch. 1, at 1583.
It has been argued that “the burgeoning of the internet is likely to render
irrelevant much of the work of the Inquiry.” LEVESON REPORT, at 736 ¶ 3.1
(noting and rejecting such arguments). In other words, how can territorial
regulation be effective in a world of instantaneous global communications? See,
e.g., Peter Preston, Leveson: An Elephantine, Sloppy Exercise In Cut-And-Paste,
THE
GUARDIAN,
(Dec.
1,
2012),
available
at
http://www.theguardian.com/media/2012/dec/02/lord-justice-leveson-inquirynewspapers (“The idea that politicians (and newspaper proprietors) will
suddenly discover a perfect way of regulating the press is bunk. To see that,
turn to the single most depressing part of Brian Leveson’s magnum opus and
the paragraphs of chop-logic where he pretends that Twitter, Facebook and the
rest don’t exist. Who cares if Prince Harry’s Las Vegas revels and Princess
Kate’s sunbathing are all over the net? Ethical, regulated newspapers are
required to pretend that US privacy laws, French snappers and international
celebrity websites that 90% of the British population can click to somehow don’t
exist. It’s a ludicrous proposition. But Leveson, safe shuffling bundles in the
warmth of his Strand courtroom, has nothing else useful to say.”).
But Leveson supporters would argue that British press regulation could
be perfectly effective, despite the Internet, because it would cover both British
print newspapers and their online offerings, not to mention those of any foreign
news outlets operating in Britain and/or targeting the British audience online.
The British audience, then, could be spared access to material that did not
comply with the press regulatory regime. Unless Britain censors the Internet,
however, information online will have worldwide availability and could be
accessed via outlets that do not operate under Leveson restrictions.
230. In any event, even if statutory regulation could be effective in theory,
the indirect character of the proxy press regulation as envisioned in the Royal
Charter model is likely to mute its effectiveness at protecting plaintiffs in
practice. It increases transactions costs, and the need to understand and
coordinate more than one part of a complex regulatory structure. If signals are
missed or misunderstood, then the very factors designed to protect the press
could end up compromising the effectiveness of the regulation, sometimes in
unpredictable ways.
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2. Inability to Limit Impacts to the “Pestilential” 231
Tabloids
To the extent that the predictable chilling effect extends
to all facets of the British press, it compromises the press’
watchdog function.
To the degree that self-censorship
principally affects the tabloid papers, then it potentially
mutes or silences a particular moral vision, 232 and implicitly
privileges an upper class type of journalism. 233
There is a widespread view—at least among the British
middle class—“that the tabloid culture is pestilential.” 234 It
arouses contempt among elites, disdain from the “quality”
press, and passionate accounts of intimidation from tabloid
targets and press-reform advocacy groups such as Hacked
Off. 235 The tabloid press in Britain has historically engaged
in invasive and cutthroat practices many of which most
observers would find beyond the pale. 236 The red-top papers’
publications policies are suspect as well. 237 It is claimed that
reprehensible tabloid practices continue unchecked because
tabloid power intimidates critics, press “omerta” 238
discourages intra-press whistleblowing, and competition leads
231. Lloyd, supra note 145, at 218 (“A large number of people do think the
tabloids are dreadful. They think they have become largely outposts of the
celebrity culture, that have a strong line in running sex scandals—mostly, too,
among celebrities but not always – and that the news they carry, when it is not
sex and celebrity, is often distorted and sometimes flat wrong.”).
232. Some have claimed that the British tabloid press sees itself as speaking
truth to power and privilege, and even perhaps to be driven by a messianic
fervor to call out violations of a particular (if contestable) moral vision. See id.
at 219. Whatever one thinks of the tabs’ moral vision, regulation leading to its
silencing is something to worry about—both from concerns about stateresponsive orthodoxy, and from vantage points prizing a diversity of voices.
233. See, e.g., John Steel, Leveson: Solution Or Symptom? Class, Crisis, And
The Degradation Of Civil Life, ETHICAL SPACE: THE INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL
OF COMMUNICATION ETHICS, vol. 10, no. 1, at 8; Paul Dacre, Why Is The Left
Obsessed By The Daily Mail?, THE GUARDIAN, (Oct. 11, 2013), available at
http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2013/oct/12/left-daily-mail-pauldacre.
234. Lloyd, supra note 145, at 218.
235. HACKED OFF, supra note 42, available at http://hackinginquiry.org/.
236. See LEVESON REPORT, supra note 7, at (on “outrageous” press behavior,
both in newsgathering and publishing). Cf. Lidsky, supra note 151 (noting
examples, inter alia the role of paparazzi in the auto accident leading to the
death of Princess Diana).
237. They are often accused of printing (or at least implying) falsehood for
partisan political gain; of degrading both public discourse and women’s rights
by pandering sex and female nudity for profit; and of legitimating political
ignorance by disregarding important political issues.
238. Bennet & Townend, supra note 181.
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to imitation of the worst kinds of scoop-seeking practices and
attention-grabbing headlines. 239
It is thus assumed that the tabloid papers are not the
raucous free press whose goal is to hold government power to
account, but simply a vehicle for pacifying the population
with stories of personal sin and moral failure—providing
“bread and circuses” rather than state-challenging
accountability reporting. Regulation proponents appear to
believe that not much would be lost if Leveson-based press
self-regulation were to result in chilling the noxious aspects of
these culturally-specific tabloid entities. 240
239. Engaging in the “dark arts” by tabloids is not a matter of individual
journalistic decision, but of organizational policy decided at the top. Carl
Bernstein, Murdoch’s Watergate?, NEWSWEEK, (July 9, 2011), available at
http://www.thedailybeast.com/newsweek/2011/07/10/murdoch-s-watergate.html
(“As anyone in the business will tell you, the standards and culture of a
journalistic institution are set from the top down, by its owner, publisher, and
top editors. Reporters and editors do not routinely break the law, bribe
policemen, wiretap, and generally conduct themselves like thugs unless it is a
matter of recognized and understood policy. Private detectives and phone
hackers do not become the primary sources of a newspaper’s information
without the tacit knowledge and approval of the people at the top. . . .”). Lord
Justice Leveson found that the culture at the top of the News of the World
created excessive pressure and competition among its journalists. See LEVESON
REPORT, supra note 7, vol. II, ch. 4, at 493 et seq. (discussing newsroom culture
at the NOTW). Carl Bernstein of Watergate fame reports that a former
executive at News Corp charged that “Murdoch invented and established this
culture in the newsroom, where you do whatever it takes to get the story, take
no prisoners, destroy the competition, and the end will justify the means.”
Rosen, supra note 145. Given the competitiveness of the British tabloids, and
the economic challenges felt by newspapers world-wide, it is no surprise to find
that at least some of the other tabloid reporters would follow the lead of the
News of the World and engage in the “dark arts” simply to remain competitive.
See David Leigh, Scandal On Tap, THE GUARDIAN, (Dec. 3, 2006), available at
http://www.theguardian.com/media/2006/dec/04/mondaymediasection
(noting
phone hacking by tabloids); see also PA, Guardian Hacking Journalist David
Leigh Won’t Be Charged, THE INDEPENDENT, (June 14, 2012), available at
http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/crime/guardian-hacking-journalistdavid-leigh-wont-be-charged-7851045.html; James Robinson, Leveson inquiry:
Guardian journalist justifies hacking if in the public interest, THE GUARDIAN,
(Dec.
6,
2011),
available
at
http://www.theguardian.com/media/2011/dec/06/leveson-inquiry-guardianphone-hacking. Even without the News of the World in the lead, such a tabloid
press facing a new raft of competitive pressures might be tempted to challenge
ordinary journalistic ethics even further in the future.
240. Given the gossipy, celebrity-focused, sex-laden coverage of these tabloid
papers, the argument might go, reining in their worst excesses would not
damage the democratic role and value of the press. See LEVESON REPORT,
supra note 7, vol. I, pt. B, ch. 2, ¶ 4.3, at 65 (adopting a political speech-focused
view of the democratic benefits of free expression and a free press). Similar
arguments have been made with regard to the U.S. press. See, e.g., Chris
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But giving the government the power to classify the
press, and declaring some journalism legitimate and other
reporting junk, is likely to invite abuse and exploitation.
Moreover, it generalizes too much to classify all tabloids all
the time as archetypes of the “bad” press. Tabloid journalism
is not simply one thing, and tabloid newspapers have broken
important public interest stories in the past. 241 The Leveson
Report could be criticized for assuming an impoverished
vision of what the British press should be in its implicit
dismissal of the tabloid press as a transgressive
alternative. 242 Perhaps the Leveson report erred in failing to
Edelson, Lies, Damned Lies, and Journalism: Why Journalists Are Failing to
Vindicate First Amendment Values and How a New Definition of “The Press”
Can Help (arguing that the Press Clause should not offer any protection to US
journalists or news institutions found to be engaging in “he said-she said”
versions of balanced journalism rather than truth-telling).
241. See, e.g., Jonathan Freedland, In Defence Of Britain’s Tabloid
Newpapers,
THE
GUARDIAN,
(Jan.
3,
2012),
available
at
http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2012/jan/03/defence-of-tabloidnewspapers (“there is more to Britain’s tabloids than sleaze and celebrity . . . .
For a true democracy cannot leave knowledge in the hands of the elite few; it
has to be spread widely.”).
242. This criticism is not a defense of the legitimacy of the popular press
simply on populist, anti-elitist grounds—that tabloid journalism is acceptable
simply because red-tops are read by many in the working class. See Mills,
supra note 21, at 23 (explaining that “[d]efending the nature and content of
tabloid news is often seen merely as an overtly populist desire to justify the
popular.”). The tabloids have been recognized by some for “promot[ing] a much
wider agenda than for quality journalism”—an agenda “which is public-led,
rather than quality journalism’s power-led agenda.” Mills, supra note 21, at 29.
It has been argued that by choosing not to speak to the middle-class audience,
by staking out a different—and more advocacy-inspired—narrative voice, by
actively seeking out “offence” as part of “legitimacy, effectiveness, and appeal,
rather than an unfortunate by-product of a different way of telling the news[,]”
Mills, supra note 21, at 25, the tabloids may have intentionally set themselves
up to provide a self-consciously contrary type of journalism. Moreover, some see
the British tabloids as messianic avengers of a particular type of moral vision.
At least in some of their coverage, tabloids seem to portray themselves as
revealing hypocrisy, challenging accepted middle-class truths and public faces,
and “speaking truth to power.” “Official journalism rests on, and perpetuates,
the assumption that there are a limited number of acceptable things to talk
about, and ways to talk about them: the vilification of tabloid journalism, then,
not only requires such assumptions, but helps to maintain such a system.”
Mills, supra note 21, at 27–28.
Of course, these accounts of tabloidism are quite abstract. When
analyzed at the concrete level, it is easy to disapprove of much tabloid
journalism—whether because their focus on sexual misconduct harks back to an
outdated, 1950s sort of morality, because their emphasis on unmasking
celebrity misbehavior distracts from the press’ central role as inculcator of
democratic competence in the public, because these justifications have little to
do with the pictures of naked women typically found on page three, and perhaps
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address directly the class issue undergirding the relationship
between the tabloid and quality press in Britain. Although
progressives decry their viewpoints and methods, right-wing
tabloids have sought political impact. It is not only tabloid
revelations of celebrities’ love lives that are at stake. 243
More generally, the Leveson approach creates a superstructure affecting many more press organs than just the
most offensive red-tops. There is no reason to believe that
press complaints adjudicated by the self-regulatory body will
be limited to the activities of the tabloid journalists; they are
likely to deter “responsible” accountability journalism as well.
This is particularly true if government chooses to target nontabloid venues traditionally associated with investigative
reporting in the public interest.
F. Is the Leveson Report’s Framework Misguided in the
New Media Age?
Evolving journalism raises the fundamental question of
whether the Leveson model’s focus on controlling the
traditional print press misses the boat in today’s digital news
environment. 244 By promoting a backward-facing structure
designed to control new media with old media norms and
techniques, the Leveson approach flirts with futility and
neglects the changes wrought by the digital fourth estate. It
may effectively increase censorship, reduce innovation,
undermine new institutional growth, and increase the divide
between traditional and new press.
even because the tabloids’ focus on the individual and on scandal may serve to
reinforce class structure and the marginalization of a working class rather than
challenging it.
Ultimately, what can be said for sure is that views differ significantly
about British tabloids. Yet the Leveson Report did not transparently address
these different kinds of claims to legitimacy by the British tabloid press.
243. Natalie Evans, Phone Hacking Trial: Sienna Miller ‘Left Daniel Craig “I
Love You” Voicemail While Out With Boyfriend Jude Law, MIRROR, (Jan. 28,
2014), available at http://www.mirror.co.uk/news/uk-news/phone-hacking-trialsienna-miller-3069470.
244. The Leveson Report has been criticized for failing to spend much time
on the Internet and online journalism. The Report addresses “the relevance of
the Internet” and the role of new media in a bit over one page. LEVESON
REPORT, supra note 7, at 736–37. See also Rob Tricchinelli, Reporters
Committee for Freedom of the Press, Could American press ever be subject to a
stateside equivalent of the Leveson Inquiry? THE NEWS MEDIA AND THE LAW,
Winter
2013,
available
at
http://www.rcfp.org/browse-media-lawresources/news-media-law/news-media-and-law-winter-2013/could-americanpress-ever-b. See also supra, note 229.
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1. Changes in the Production and Dissemination of News
The Leveson Report has been chided for its minimal
attention to the Internet. It distinguishes the Internet from
the press by asserting that “the [I]nternet does not claim to
operate by any particular ethical standards, still less high
ones . . . so that bloggers and others may, if they choose, act
with impunity.” 245 Then, it asserts “a qualitative difference”
between online and newspaper content, and assumes that as
a result, “people will not assume that what they read on the
Internet is trustworthy or that it carries any particular
assurance or accuracy; it need be no more than one person’s
In the Leveson view, presumably, the nonview.” 246
institutional blogosphere is not particularly powerful or
influential, and regulating the mainstream press could
effectively achieve the right balance in public discourse
between speech and privacy regardless of the contributions of
bloggers.
The problem with this approach is that it is not
particularly realistic today. The Internet has changed the
news landscape on every front. 247 The networked Fourth
Estate has already begun to generate new practitioners,
practices, styles, and norms of journalism. It could be argued
that the Internet has democratized news—generated a
broader, more expansive view of what we should consider to
be news and how it should be made, disseminated, and
discussed.
Even now, it is arguably difficult to distinguish cleanly
between the categories of blogs and the press 248—as the
Huffington Post has amply demonstrated. Such a binary
characterization does not reflect lived experience.
The
blurring of that distinction will surely increase in the future.
While the old media—newspapers, television, and radio—are
“in retreat,” 249 an Internet-based new media is emerging—
mixing, among others, solo blogs, old media web presences,
group discussion web sites, Twitter, social media, and non245. LEVESON REPORT, at 737 ¶ 3.3.
246. Id.
247. For a description of some changes brought to traditional journalism
from digital networks, see Levi, supra note 159, at 1548–56. See also
Papandrea, Citizen Journalism and the Reporter’s Privilege, 521–32 (March 19,
2007) (on the changing nature of journalism).
248. See Benkler, supra note 11; Cohen, supra note 210, at 3.
249. Cohen, supra note 210, at 3.
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profit online investigative organizations. 250 The new media
sector contains “a mixture of different kinds of actors: some
are clearly journalists, some are communicators who would
never be confused with journalists, and some lie in
between.” 251
As established news institutions compete with new
entrants into the news space, they increasingly involve their
audience in the generation, processing, and vetting of news. 252
The types of sources seen as legitimate are expanded. The
new journalism involves crowd-sourcing information, using
non-professional journalists’ material and photographic
images, permitting the public to comment on stories—in sum,
engaging in various sorts of pro-am journalism that is
celebrated by what has been called the Future of News
consensus. 253 Some journalism is computer-generated, and
does not even involve many journalists. 254 Moreover, the
availability of unparalleled amounts of data and the
unprecedented capacity to manipulate it also make newly
possible the growth of large-scale data-based journalism.255
Although these kinds of online journalism still supplement
traditional journalism, they increasingly “fill the gaps” left by
the mainstream press’s declining resources. 256 Moreover,
journalism is now a much more tentative and iterative
process requiring real time examination and evaluation of
contested accounts of events. 257

250. Id. at 3, 15–19.
251. Id. at 3, 14–15.
252. See, e.g., Brian McNair, Trust, Truth and Objectivity, in RETHINKING
JOURNALISM: TRUST AND PARTICIPATION IN A TRANSFORMED NEWS LANDSCAPE
83 (Chris Peters & M.J. Broersma, eds. 2012) (describing The Guardian crowdsourcing project in 2011).
See also Crowdsourcing, THE GUARDIAN,
http://www.theguardian.com/technology/crowdsourcing.
253. Dean Starkman, Confidence Game, COLUM. J. REV., (Nov. 8, 2011),
available at http://www.cjr.org/essay/confidence_game.php?page=all (coining the
phrase). See also Levi, supra note 159, at 1548 (discussing the “new journalism”
and the FON consensus); Cohen, supra note 210.
254. Steve Lohr, In Case You Wondered, a Real Human Wrote This Article,
N.Y.
TIMES,
(Sept.
10,
2011),
available
at
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/09/11/business/computer-generated-articles-aregaining-traction.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0; The Pew Research Center’s
Project for Excellence in Journalism, State of the News Media 2013, STATE OF
THE NEWS MEDIA, overview at 3 (2013), available at http://stateofthemedia.org/.
255. See McNair, supra 252, at 82 (noting data-based journalism).
256. Cohen, supra note 210, at 4.
257. Alfred Hermida, Tweets And Truth: Journalism As A Discipline Of
Collaborative Verification, JOURNALISM PRACTICE, (Mar. 27, 2012), available at
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New entrants unaffiliated with the institutional press do,
in fact, have (sometimes outsize) influence on global public
discourse. Much news today is distributed not by mainstream
newspapers—although newspapers are still the most critical
aspect of the modern news ecosystem 258—but in one way or
another processed by bloggers, aggregators, citizen
journalists, random tweeters, story commenters, and social
media friendship networks.
Internet sources get wide
distribution by links.
The Leveson assumptions about journalism online ignore
the reality that important stories in the public interest can be
broken these days by bloggers at home, unsavory
whistleblowers, small non-profit online investigative outfits,
and even ideologically-motivated examples of a renascent
party press. 259 Whether or not they do so in their pajamas, 260
bloggers and tweeters can affect the content, arc, duration,
and intensity of news and public affairs coverage. They may
at least sometimes set the agenda for mainstream press
coverage, and add reporting and images. They may serve to
publicize stories the mainstream media did not choose to
publish. 261
They step into a vacuum increasingly created by the
retrenchment of traditional print media institutions.
Economic pressures on the traditional press have led it to
Increasingly overstretched
reduce reporting power. 262

http://tandfonline.com/10.1080/17512786.2012.667269.
258. Levi, Social Media, supra note 159, at 1539 and sources cited therein.
See also The Pew Research Center’s Project for Excellence in Journalism, supra
note 254.
259. See, e.g., The Drudge Report, available at http://www.drudgereport.com/.
Daily Kos is an example of a liberal blog. www.dailykos.net. See also Cohen,
supra note 210, at 23–26, 76. This is even though, as Professor Ed Baker
powerfully recognized, there is audience concentration in the blogosphere as
well. C. EDWIN BAKER, MEDIA CONCENTRATION AND DEMOCRACY: WHY
OWNERSHIP MATTERS 107 (2007).
Diversity across the press sector can help a variety of press goals
flourish. If we are ambivalent about our social and press ends, it is “deeply
unwise . . . to give exclusive dominion to one or another point of view.” Robert
Post, Understanding the First Amendment, 87 WASH. L. REV. 549, 560 (2012).
260. Larry E. Ribstein, From Bricks to Pajamas: The Law and Economics of
Amateur Journalism, 48 WM. & MARY L. REV. 185 (2006) (discussing image of
bloggers in pajamas).
261. LEVESON REPORT, supra note 7, at 170–71 (describing use of blogs by
newspapers as proxies).
262. See State of the News Media 2013, supra note 254, overview at 3
(describing “shrinking reporting power” of the traditional press). See also

2015]

TAMING THE “FERAL BEAST”

389

editorial resources have also made the traditional press more
reliant on the information provided by sophisticated
newsmakers. 263 And new practitioners of journalism online
are increasingly being incorporated into “the larger media
ecology.” 264
The transmission of news and information via the
Internet also increases the global dimension of news. It
enables not only the delivery of hyper-local material and the
“Daily Me” with its individually-tailored focus, but also the
possibility of global audiences for what might previously have
been thought of as issues of local or regional interest.
Some nascent online news organizations have also begun
to function as watchdogs over both government and private
power. 265 While they do not have the size and heft of the
major players in the institutional press, they are also said to
be undeterred by factors responsible for mainstream media’s
restraint in criticizing government and powerful economic
actors. 266
Even the style of journalism increasingly varies. The
press increasingly includes activist journalists seeking to
advance advocacy goals alongside more traditional journalists
espousing professional norms of objectivity and neutrality. 267
Institutional relationships have also changed—with
increasing collaborations by reporters and news organizations
world-wide.
Finally, some have provocatively questioned whether a
“gray market in journalism” will inevitably be generated by
the security state’s information lock-down and the intellectual
property regime’s exclusionary framing of expression as

Luckhurst, supra note 151 (referring to Index on Censorship chief executive
John Kampfner’s argument that “journalism is too weak, not too strong” and
reiterating the advice to Justice Leveson to “prevent wrongdoing without killing
an already sick patient . . . .”).
263. State of the News Media 2013, supra note 254, overview at 3.
264. Cohen, supra note 210, at 26. The uncertainty about scope of coverage
is not resolved by the remedy provisions in the Crimes and Courts Act, 2013
passed by Parliament to effectuate the Leveson incentives. See Crimes and
Courts Act, 2013, supra note 78.
265. Id. at 29–34.
266. Id. (describing examples of mainstream media timorousness over
criticizing government and capture by corporate interests).
267. See, e.g., Cohen, supra note 210, at 34. Norms of objectivity have been
claimed by newspapers in the US, as opposed to British newspapers, which
have a history of partisan points of view.
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property. 268 At a minimum, all these developments have led
to more variety in the news environment.
These changes signal both change and increasing
diversity in the current news landscape. Yet the Leveson/
Royal Charter approach would likely hamper many
significant and potentially beneficial aspects of the new
production and dissemination infrastructure. For example,
strict liability for everything appearing in newspapers 269—
including anything said in online comments, or any crowdsourced
material, or
material
published
for
its
newsworthiness (even if not its accuracy)—could, as a
practical matter, lead to reduced reliance on precisely what is
generative in the new journalism space.
The rational
response to such a strict liability regime would be to shut off
comments, avoid crowd-sourcing news stories, minimize
reliance on unaffiliated photographers, and return to a predigital press era. In the era of the citizen journalist, when
even the most mainstream of press organizations have
involved their audience not only in commenting but also in
the reporting of news, this approach is backward-looking and
unrealistic.
Applying the Leveson approach to new media threatens
to undermine important democratizing developments over
time.
Any self-regulatory body subject to continuing
recognition body oversight under the Royal Charter is likely
to adopt and apply a journalistic code of ethics in a
disciplinary way. This is obviously problematic for the
traditional print press, but presents even greater
foundational difficulties for the networked Fourth Estate.
Moreover, it can be used by traditional commercial media as a
weapon to delay innovation in digital journalism.
2. The Illusory Benefits of Disciplinary Codes
The entire structure undergirding the self-regulatory
body requires the development of a coherent vision of the
public interest and a regulator-developed journalistic code of
ethics. However, Justice Leveson’s belief in the ability of a
journalistic code of ethics to provide clear guidelines for
balancing public access to information and norms such as
privacy is questionable in the current environment.
268. I am indebted to Patrick Gudridge for this provocation.
269. Royal Charter, supra note 60, sched. 3, at 8B.
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Reliance on an ethics code subject to the imprimatur of
the Royal Charter recognition body is arguably a problem for
three reasons: first, because codes themselves by definition
have complex relationships with lived practice; second,
because a diverse media landscape and rapid evolutions in
journalistic practices undermine the ability to articulate
universal values in a code; and third, because disciplinary
uses of codes enable incumbent-protective activity. 270
Application of an ethics code that does not adequately reflect
this reality opens the door to more effective censorship.
The Leveson Report’s reliance on an ethics code
effectively transforms the code from a tool whose goal is to
guide journalists’ actual practices (however ineffectively) into
a disciplining device wielded by a powerful enforcement body,
potentially against unpopular targets.
Because of the
complicated relationship between journalism ethics codes and
the actual practices of journalists, some would argue that it is
misguided by definition to turn those codes into disciplinary
metrics. 271 It may be that the new environment of the
globalizing news market and the networked Fourth Estate
will further undermine the authority of codes (or at least
generate a multiplicity of codes for the many different kinds
of journalism that will be practiced)—as journalistic practice
increasingly “eludes standardization.” 272
270. For a critique of the chilling effect of the process by which the code is to
be developed by the regulator, see supra text accompanying note 190.
271. At a minimum, it could be argued, it is a mistake for courts to test
journalistic behavior by reference to either the broad or the concrete provisions
of journalistic practice codes. Just as the aspirational guidelines may be
insufficiently directive in the multiplicity of concrete situations facing
journalists, the concrete prohibitions in such codes (such as the common
prohibition of paying for stories) may at times undermine the public interest in
important information. Zelizer, supra note 179, at 275 (describing examples in
which “the unethical nature of news-gathering [and the use of checkbook
journalism] . . . might have denied the US public fuller information critical to its
functioning as a body politic. Furthermore, ethics codes offer a sliding scale of
evaluation: If paying for information was acceptable in these cases, who is to
say where its appropriateness ends?”).
In addition, the availability of different journalistic ethics codes in the
United States itself grants too much discretion to courts to select their preferred
norms and judicially craft professional boundaries.
272. Zelizer, supra note 179, at 274. It may also be that the codes don’t work
except to the extent that the problems faced by the journalists are similar to
problems they have previously encountered. Without exaggerating the changes
wrought by the Internet, one can reasonably wonder whether past experience
can continue to be all that directive when journalism is changing on all fronts—
newsgathering, presentation, and dissemination. See also MEGAN KNIGHT &
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Even if evolving codes—organically generated by
engagement in the varieties of journalism developing today—
are useful to reporters and editors as advisory guides for
conduct, it is questionable whether they can and should be
used as disciplinary tools. 273 As one proponent of the new
journalism put it recently, “[g]ood journalism ethics don’t
grow from strong rules. Good journalism ethics grow from
strong conversations about our values and about making good
decisions based in those values.” 274 The threat of censorship
and the possible misuse of codes in that kind of context exist
both for governmental bodies and for private press groups. 275
CLARE C OOK, S OCIAL M EDIA FOR JOURNALISTS : PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE
142 (2013) (noting that formal guidelines of many news organizations err “when
they assume that the network is like the newsstand” and that the “more
progressive” of those guidelines reflect the networked environment by placing “a
greater emphasis on the autonomy of the journalist, and on their ability to
make judgments on how they should behave in any given context.”).
273. See Peter Preston, Peter Preston: ‘Leveson Sees Journalism As An
Exercise In Providing Cases For The Courts To Examine’, PRESS GAZETTE, (Feb.
25,
2013),
available
at
http://www.pressgazette.co.uk/content/peterprestonleveson-sees-journalism-exercise-providing-cases-courts-examine.
We
should hesitate to transform journalism codes into legalized, disciplinary
mechanisms also because professional values may be at odds with one another
at different levels of analysis and with other professional values. Weaver et al.,
infra note 276, at 473–94, 534–44.
274. Steve Buttry, Upholding And Updating Journalism Ethics: My Colorado
Keynote, THE BUTTRY DIARY BLOG, (Mar. 15, 2014), available at
http://stevebuttry.wordpress.com/2014/03/15/upholding-and-updatingjournalism-ethics-my-colorado-keynote/.
275. See Benkler, supra note 11 (noting that mainstream mass media largely
disavowed the journalistic activities of Wikileaks). See also, supra note 165,
(describing Daily Mail’s criticism of The Guardian for publishing articles based
on information leaked by Snowden).
Some have argued that “journalistic practice—as it takes shape in news
gathering, news presentation, and news distribution—defies the establishment
of meaningful ethical standards.” Zelizer, supra note 179, at 271. There are
lessons to be learned from the fact that journalists (by contrast to academics—
and, perhaps, judges)—“eschew and deride” ethics codes. Id. at 272. They are
said to do so because “[t]hey see dominant approaches to ethics as simplifying,
restricting, or ignoring the various materialities by which the news is crafted.”
Id. at 272. As press sociologist Barbie Zelizer has explained: “The problem with
ethics derives in large part from . . . the difficulty that ensues in establishing
standards for shifting practice . . . . [N]ews-gathering takes shape in situations
largely beyond the control of journalists, where rapidly unfolding news stories,
high stakes, a marked degree of risk and inherent unpredictability are all part
of the ground that journalists must navigate on their way to making news.
News presentation, complicated perhaps more than ever before by corporatism,
privatization, sensationalism and convergence, is often decided without the
input of the journalist who gathered the news. And news distribution in today’s
online environment has multiple shapes, platforms and audiences, making one
form of a news story a thing of the past. Instead, multimodal journalists are
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The Leveson Report gives the impression that many of
the transformations enabled by the Internet would violate the
norms likely to be developed by the self-regulatory body. 276
regularly expected to rework news angles for multiple objectives alongside nonjournalists who are doing the same. . . . Journalism is thus more porous, more
unstable, more variegated and less authoritative than might be assumed.
Though it may be relatively easy to delineate one’s ethical aspirations as a
journalist, it is far more difficult to translate those aspirations into practice
across the range of situations with which journalists regularly engage.” Id. at
273–74.
Even for old media, the codes serve principally as aspirational guides
(with a few concrete prohibitions). See Richard T. Karcher, Tort Law and
Journalism Ethics, 40 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 781, 783–85, 793 (2009) (describing the
CCJ and SPJ codes and citing to numerous others). For additional discussions
of journalism codes in the US, see, for example, Blake D. Morant, The Endemic
Reality of Media Ethics and Self-Restraint, 19 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB.
POL’Y, 595 (2005); Jeff Storey, Does Ethics Make Good Law? A Case Study, 19
CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 467 (2012). Cf. Holger Sievert, Reporting (in)
Europe: Heuristic Remarks on Old and New Research on ‘European Journalism’
in COMMUNICATION AND LEADERSHIP IN THE 21ST CENTURY: THE
DIFFICULT PATH FROM CLASSICAL PUBLIC RELATIONS TO GENUINE
MODERN COMMUNICATION MANAGEMENT (H. Sievert / D. Bell, eds.
2008) at 19–20, available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=965732 (observing
European journalistic diversity and noting that even in old media, and even
within Europe, studies show significant variation in journalists’ professional
self-concept and goals). They are also artifacts of their historical contexts. For
example, the history of Western journalism ethics codes has been described as
reflecting the needs of a particular historical moment—as part of a shift from
journalistic models of partisanship to those of professionalism and objectivity.
See Zelizer, supra note 179, at 272–73 (“The first ethics codes in journalism
came into being in the late nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries, aligned
with the ascent of a model of professionalism and a particular notion of
modernity. Richly implicated in the quest for truth, that mindset saw
rationality, objectivity, impartiality and reason as the modes of engagement,
which journalists could offer those needing information about the world and the
ethics codes that reflected its values.
Ethics codes thus mirrored a
transformation in journalists’ affiliations from reigning work models of
partisanship to those of objectivity, and justified those hoping to promote
journalism as more of a profession than an occupation. In so doing they set in
place a prism for evaluating journalistic practice that was aligned with
particular expectations of professionalism in a particular kind of modern
context.”).
276. For example, while big data (including government information and
information collected from individuals’ online activities) creates the possibility
for extraordinarily broad-scale investigative journalism, it also implicates issues
of information privacy. Pro-am investigative techniques, despite their many
benefits, may also lead to increased error, failure to check sources adequately,
and a contextual reporting. See Levi, supra note 159, at 1556–73 (discussing
the dangers of the “new journalism.”); Cohen, supra note 210, at 39 et seq. One
empirical study in 2007 found that online journalists were significantly more
likely than their print (although not their broadcast) counterparts to say that
numerous types of controversial reporting practices “may be justified on
occasion.” THE AMERICAN JOURNALIST IN THE 21ST CENTURY: U.S.
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Arguably, Leveson-compliant code-drafting entities would
have incentives to craft codes of journalistic ethics skewing
toward the norms of the traditional printed broadsheets. If
mainstream media feared the onslaught of competition from
Internet-enabled non-professional journalism, for example,
then wouldn’t code-drafting committees dominated by the
mainstream institutional press have an incentive to draft
journalism ethics codes that valorized only their kind of
mainstream journalism? If the resulting codes had real teeth,
they could provide a cheap way to disadvantage competitors.
If so, couldn’t the Leveson approach potentially invite
mainstream media industry protectionism? 277 Even if that
were not the case, to the extent that the Royal Charter
system would exempt some important digital participants
while applying to others, it would effectively interfere in the
evolution and structuring of the digital news space.
Press reformers would argue that traditional ethical
boundaries must be reinforced and policed precisely because
of concerns about a likely increase in ethics violations by new
journalists.
Regulation supporters would worry that a
combination of the Internet-influenced “new journalism” and
the economic pressures on the “old-school” press would lead to

NEWS PEOPLE AT THE DAWN OF A NEW MILLENIUM 222 (David H.
Weaver et al., 2007). The rise of social, fact-based news is likely to lead to an
increased amount of falsity, at a minimum because not all the participants have
the professional training to avoid it. Insufficiently sourced, ideologically biased,
self-serving and inflammatory news accounts can all-too-easily make their way
to millions of readers online. Cohen, supra note 210, at 39–42 (describing rightwing blogger Andrew Breitbart’s misleading story concerning Department of
Agriculture employee Shirley Sherrod’s purported racism). See also Derek
Bambauer, Consider the Censor, 1 WAKE FOREST J. OF L. & POL’Y 34–42 (2011)
(describing WikiLeaks and the dangers of control of information by small groups
of cyber-activists). The global scope of networked journalism may also augment
the need to engage in newsgathering in places with very different ethical norms
for reporting. See Zelizer, supra note 179.
277. Admittedly, the reality today is that the mainstream press is deeply
enmeshed in figuring out the future of media, has already begun to participate
in new approaches to the journalistic enterprise, and already incorporates the
Internet and its audience in extensive ways. Traditional newspapers are aware
that they must share the field with new entrants, and are busy defining the
“value added” they can provide in the future and the new curatorial and
analytic role they are likely to play. With it online initiatives, its acceptance of
crowd-sourcing, and its openness to reader comments, the modern newspaper
appears more open to the possibility of different ways of doing journalism. Its
publishers are unlikely to believe that they can effectively maintain a
backward-looking place and status for old-fashioned newspapers by
manipulating a journalistic code drafting process.
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increases in irresponsibility and inaccuracy. 278 Because many
of the “new” journalists and news outlets do not have the kind
of brand associated in the public mind, rightly or wrongly,
with mainstream news organizations, the public does not
have a “veracity proxy” on which it can rely. 279 In addition to
conferring special legitimacy on the included group, then,
policing traditional boundaries could reduce the possibility of
error and audience confusion.
That important stories might be uncovered through
means that a regulatory body might deem to violate a
conventional journalism code does not necessarily deprive
them of their significance in the public interest, however.
The very changes in journalism that have been enabled by
the digital environment arguably lead to much beneficial
innovation as well. 280
The social benefits of the “new” journalism should not be
ignored in the race to avoid its harms. While the immediacy
of Twitter may put pressure on journalistic standards of
accuracy, the millions of Twitter users and 800 million
Facebook subscribers can create a fact-checking matrix likely
278. One could reassuringly speculate that traditional press institutions
could serve as a professionalizing influence on the potential excesses of the
networked Fourth Estate. Yet, it is not certain that the traditional institutional
press will inevitably exert such a professionalizing influence—or do so in a
desirable way.
The Leveson Report’s critique of the PCC reinforced the Justice’s view
that purely voluntary self-regulation would not be successful. See LEVESON
REPORT , supra note 7, at Ch. 6, ¶ 2.5 et seq. That is neither necessarily correct
nor an insuperable difficulty. There are many ways to measure the “success” of
any self-regulatory scheme. Id. at 755. Some stack the deck. The Leveson
Report’s discussion of theories of regulation (see id. pt. K, ch. 6, at 1734 et seq.)
does not adequately address this issue. See Simon Jenkins, Cameron Is Right
About Leveson, THE GUARDIAN, (Nov. 30, 2012) (“We do not say the burglary
laws have “failed” just because burglary continues.”). For an argument that the
PCC’s apparent regulatory failure was attributable to inappropriate
expectations of such an entity, see William Dutton, Save the Fourth Estate, LSE
MEDIA
POLICY
PROJECT,
(Oct.
11,
2013),
available
at
http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/mediapolicyproject/2013/10/11/william-dutton-save-thefourth-estate/. Moreover, there may be ways of promoting better voluntary selfregulation without going all the way to the kind of dangerous, continuingoversight regulatory regime as that enshrined by the Royal Charter approach.
279. Cohen, supra note 210, at 41–42. That is increasingly less the case as
well-established blogs earn their own reputational credibility. Id. at 76
(mentioning Talking Points Memo and SCOTUSblog as examples).
280. See, e.g., Tom Engelhardt, Are We in a New Golden Age of Journalism?,
MOTHER
JONES,
(Jan.
21,
2014),
available
at
http://www.motherjones.com/media/2014/01/new-golden-age-journalism-dailynewspaper-rise-internet.
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to combat the enhanced accountability challenges likely to
arise in the modern journalistic ecosystem. 281 Although
online reporting may increase the likelihood of legal liability,
it may also help promote a self-correcting marketplace of
ideas. 282 Citizen journalists, non-profit news purveyors, and
other online actors provide desirable diversity in the
perspectives from which they report the news. 283 They can
serve to enlarge the “sphere of legitimate debate” defined by
the traditional press, and even open the door to some views
from the “sphere of deviance” shunned by mainstream news
organizations. 284 An assessment of the press that does not
speak to the complexities of the modern landscape is the
poorer for it.
And press regulation that would target
innovative new developments would disserve the public
interest more than it would serve the goals articulated in the
Leveson Report.
Finally, to the extent that the goal of press reform is to
reduce specific sorts of press behavior deemed inconsistent
with privacy norms, recent history suggests that legal
changes other than wholesale press reform can help achieve
it. For example, since changes to the Bribery Act in 2010
have made it more difficult for journalists to pay for stories
from the police and public officials, editors report that
journalists have gone back to old-fashioned methods of
journalism. 285
Because most citizen journalists are more vulnerable
than the large institutional press to pressure and
intimidation by the threat of lawsuits or fines, they are
potentially more likely to self-censor—undermining the public
interest. 286 Even when that is not the case—and when it is
281. Levi, supra note 159.
282. Id. See also Lyrissa Barnett Lidsky, Silencing John Doe: Defamation &
Discourse in Cyberspace, 49 DUKE L.J. 855 (2000).
283. Cohen, supra note 210, at 5.
284. Jay Rosen, Audience Atomization Overcome: Why the Internet Weakens
the Authority of the Press, PRESSTHINK, (Jan. 12, 2009), available at
http://archive.pressthink.org/2009/01/12/atomization.html (describing Daniel
Hallen’s model of American journalism as consisting of the sphere of consensus,
the sphere of legitimate debate, and the sphere of deviance). See also Cohen,
supra note 210, at 5, 27
285. John Plunkett, Sun Editor: Journalists Have Gone Back To Traditional
Methods,
THE
GUARDIAN,
(Nov.
11,
2013),
available
at
http://www.theguardian.com/media/2013/nov/11/sun-editor-journalists-daviddinsmore.
286. Cohen, supra note 210, at 65–66. Indeed, to the extent that the new
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the traditional media that most wither under Leveson-type
scrutiny—negative consequences might follow. Specifically,
to the extent that emergent journalism could benefit from the
professional practices and ethics norms of traditional
newspapers, a cowed and self-censored mainstream print
press could not properly serve that norm-propagation
function. Moreover, effective censorship can undermine the
ability of new entrants to develop institutional heft over time.
In light of the diminishing power of the beleaguered
traditional press, this would reinforce diminution in press
power overall at the moment when a powerful press is most
needed as a counterweight to government abuses of power.
Roadblocks to the development of new press institutions
should be resisted. 287
III.

THE “MESSAGE” PROBLEM: WHAT SIGNAL IS THE
U.K. SENDING ABROAD BY ITS PRESS REFORM
EFFORTS?

Numerous international news organizations have voiced
concerns about the “message” sent to the world by Britain’s
foray into press regulation. 288 The principal argument of these

media actors are the speech intermediaries, they may have little self-perception
as First Amendment actors and slim commitment to press values.
287. See, e.g., Emily Bell, Clay Shirky & C.W. Anderson, Post-Industrial
Journalism: Adapting to the Present, TOW CENTER FOR DIGITAL JOURNALISM
REPORT (Nov. 2012).
288. See, e.g., Jason Deans, Press Regulation: Seven Global Groups Urge
Queen Not To Sign ‘Toxic’ Charter, THE GUARDIAN, (Oct. 24, 2013), available at
http://www.theguardian.com/media/2013/oct/24/press-regulation-queen-toxiccharter (arguing that the “toxic” press reform Royal Charter would be nothing
more than “camouflage for a “set of repressive statutory controls” being imposed
on the industry against its will.”). After the Charter was adopted despite that
protest, WAN-IFRA sent an unprecedented delegation to the UK in response to
“international concerns surrounding the situation for press freedom in the
United Kingdom.” Larry Kilman, World’s Press Examines UK Press Freedom,
WAN-IFRA, (Jan. 17, 2014), available at http://www.wan-ifra.org/pressreleases/2014/01/17/world-s-press-examines-uk-press-freedom. See also, supra
note 3, infra note 289.
According to its website, WAN-IFRA “is the global organisation of the
world’s newspapers and news publishers. It represents more than 18,000
publications, 15,000 online sites and over 3,000 companies in more than 120
countries.” Its core mission is to defend and promote “press freedom, quality
journalism and editorial integrity and the development of prosperous
businesses.” See Larry Kilman, About Wan-Ifra, WAN-IFRA, http://www.wanifra.org/about-wan-infra.
The delegation’s mission
“highlighted serious
concerns regarding the independence from political involvement in that process,
and how implementation of the legislation that underpins the Royal Charter
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non-UK journalists and editors is that the diminution in
British press freedom sends a highly repressive signal to
other countries. 289 In its recent report criticizing the Royal
Charter, WAN-IFRA adverted to “growing evidence, reported
by the WAN-IFRA membership, that the British approach—
either in terms of regulation, or in the misuse of terrorism
and national security legislation—is being used by repressive
regimes to excuse their own practices toward the Press.” 290
Many countries in the world are far less protective of free
speech and press than Britain. Under those circumstances, a
repressive signal from the U.K. is problematic in two ways.
The first is that some governments seeking to rein in their
press might cite or gain inspiration from the British example
in order to adopt their own “reforms.” 291 WAN-IFRA points to
“the UK’s continued influence over developing nations where
media are essential for the spread of democratic values[.]” 292
The Campaign to Protect Journalists (CPJ)—a group of
American reporters and editors—highlighted a variety of
attempts to control the “irresponsible” press by countries as
far flung as South Africa, Hungary and Russia. 293 It is
could potentially be abused to restrict a free press both here in the UK and
abroad.” News Release, World’s Press Examines UK Press Freedom, WANIFRA,
Jan.
17,
2014,
available
at
http://www.wan-ifra.org/pressreleases/2014/01/17/world-s-press-examines-uk-press-freedom.
289. Id. (“The mission highlighted WAN-IFRA’s concern that general
confusion surrounding changes to the self-regulation system for the press in the
United Kingdom, coupled with the government’s chilling intimidation of The
Guardian, is sending a negative message to the international community. That
foreign governments may cite the current British example when reforming their
own regulatory processes, as well as the inspiration they may take in how to
treat investigative journalism, remain of particular concern and risks causing
serious repercussions worldwide.”). WAN-IFRA also pointed to the U.K.
government’s “chilling intimidation of the Guardian.” Id.
290. WAN-IFRA, PRESS FREEDOM, supra note 4 at 28.
291. See, e.g., Anri Van Der Spuy & Emma Goodman, The Leveson Report
Anniversary: A Celebration or a Commemoration?, LSE MEDIA PROJECT BLOG,
(Dec.
2,
2013),
available
at
http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/mediapolicyproject/2013/12/02/the-leveson-reportanniversary-a-celebration-or-a-commemoration/ (citing Article 19 legal counsel
position that “[m]any other countries that may be evaluating the ways in which
they govern their press systems are watching what is going on in the UK . . . .”).
292. WAN-IFRA, PRESS FREEDOM, supra note 4.
293. Van Der Spuy & Goodman, supra note 291. In fact, the group revealed
that a Russian lawmaker had “seized on the British example to propose the
creation of a Russian media regulator . . . with powers to censure, fine, and even
close down news outlets, bypassing the judicial system.” UK Urged To
Reconsider Post-Leveson Media Proposals, COMMITTEE TO PROTECT
JOURNALISTS, (Apr. 2, 2013), available at http://cpj.org/2013/04/uk-urged-to-
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notable in this connection that the Leveson approach is said
to be more extensive and coercive than most other Press
Councils in Europe. 294 At a minimum, without such a signal,
countries seeking to control their press might have incentives
to be less blatant in their efforts.
Second, and most notably, press-repressive states can
also use British press reform as a weapon to blunt criticism of
their press control regimes. Former Guardian editor Peter
Preston warns that “[i]t matters . . . what messages the
process [of press regulation] sends to foreign states where
democracy has frailer roots.” 295 Operating under a potentially
repressive press regime deprives the U.K. of its moral high
ground on the subject. As the CPJ recently warned the
British Prime Minister, press regulation could erode British
“moral authority” to object to press censorship in other
countries, particularly former members of the British
empire. 296 Having succumbed to press regulation subverts
Britain’s ability to promote the value of an untrammeled
press world-wide.
reconsider-post-leveson-media-proposal.php.
294. Lara Fielden, Regulating the Press: A Comparative Study of
International Press Councils, REUTERS INSTITUTE, (Apr. 2012), available at
https://reutersinstitute.politics.ox.ac.uk/fileadmin/documents/Publications/Work
ing_Papers/Regulating_the_Press.pdf.
295. Preston, supra note 229.
296. See Rowena Mason, American journalists urge David Cameron to drop
press regulation plans, THE DAILY TELEGRAPH (Apr. 3, 2013) (“Campaign to
Protect Journalists (CPJ) urges Mr. Cameron to “step back” from creating a new
regulator as it would set a bad example to repressive dictatorships.”). The
CPJ’s directors include senior figures from ABC News, NBC, Bloomberg, the
Chicago Tribune, The N.Y. Times, CBS News, The New Yorker, The
Washington Post, the Nation, Getty Images and the Miami Herald. Dan
Rather, Arianna Huffington, and Paul Steiger, president of ProPublica, sit on
the CPJ’s board. Id.
Some Leveson proponents argue that the only reason other countries
could use UK press reform to justify their own repression of the press is because
the press has misled the world by its distorted reporting on the Royal Charter.
See, e.g., Steven Barnett, Leveson Past, Present and Future: The Politics of Press
Regulation, THE POLITICAL QUARTERLY No. 3, at 353, July-Sep. 2013; Angela
Phillips, Distorting The Debate On Media Reform, INFORRM’S BLOG (Jan. 18,
2014), available at http://inforrm.wordpress.com/2014/01/18/distorting-thedebate-on-media-reform-angela-phillips/. That the British proposal does not
entail direct state regulation of the press does not mean that it cannot serve as
an excuse for more authoritarian regimes to justify and deflect criticism of their
far more draconian press control regimes. Moreover, whatever the substantive
merits of the point, however, the reality is that a message has been sent to the
world that the British are willing to engage in regulation of the press (at least to
a much greater degree than heretofore).
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CONCLUSION
The phone-hacking scandal of 2011 served as an occasion
for British consideration of an experiment in “voluntary selfregulation” of the press backed up by Royal Charter
underpinning. Had Lord Justice Leveson, author of the
regime, limited his review to how to pass and enforce laws
that would minimize press reliance on illegal “dark arts”
(such as phone-hacking, blagging, purchase of information
from public officials, door-stepping etc.), 297 the proposed press
reforms would have been unexceptionable. But, instead, the
reform approach sought to discipline the press and promote
“responsibility.” It became “a classic example of overkill[.]” 298
Instead of increased press responsibility, its most significant
impact is likely to be enhanced press timorousness at the very
moment when courageous reporting is most necessary to keep
states and their agents in check.
British press reform revises the balance of power
between the press, the government and the political elite in
ways that are likely to “protect secrets—personal, political,
and corporate—that only an irreverent press is likely to ferret
out.” 299 This is not simply about controlling tabloid excesses;
the impact of the Royal Charter regime will not be limited to
the tabloids. Nor can it realistically be about protecting
privacy of the press’ victims, as the worldwide dissemination
of information over the Internet undermines British ability to
constrain publication.
The particular provisions of the
system—although structured with Rube Goldberg complexity
to appear to avoid state control—in fact promise a significant
chilling effect on British newspapers.
The chill is likely to be felt far beyond British borders.
Journalists world-wide are already subject to physical danger,
death threats, imprisonment, and lawsuits—reporting under
Government
increasingly dangerous conditions today. 300
threats against journalism today are more extensive and
powerful than ever. We live in the time of both the
297.
298.
299.
300.

See Levi, supra note 159.
Lester, supra note 203, at 189–90.
Burns, supra note 5.
See, e.g., Maya Taal, CPJ Risk List: Where Press Freedom Suffered,
COMMITTEE
TO
PROTECT
JOURNALISTS,
available
at
https://cpj.org/2014/02/attacks-on-the-press-cpj-risk-list-1.php
(cataloguing
dangers to journalists and roadblocks to reporting inter alia from Russia,
Turkey, China, Ecuador, Syria).
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surveillance state—engaging in massive surveillance of
populations—and also the security state—resisting disclosure
of state programs of mass surveillance on security grounds.
The state in turn deploys both public and private power to
achieve its ends. Under such circumstances, it is unduly
optimistic to contend that structures with the potential for
press control will not be used to the full extent of their
influence. The new regulatory strategies available to states
must also be assessed in light of the increasing economic
threats facing news organizations, and the uncertainties
created by a rapidly-changing digital news landscape.
Initiatives like British press regulation, no matter how
measured they appear on their face, pose a profound threat to
journalistic freedom everywhere.

